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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ANNULMENT - PERSONAL JURISDICTION - COURT OF PLAINTIFF'S
DOMICILE HAS JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT SERVED
BY REGISTERED MAIL.
Perlstein v. Perlstein (Conn. 1964)
Plaintiff husband, a domiciliary and resident' of Connecticut, brought
suit in a Connecticut court against his defendant wife, a domiciliary and
resident of New Jersey, seeking a decree annuling 2 their purported mar-
riage on. the ground that defendant was legally married to another when
she went through a marriage ceremony with plaintiff in 1959. Service on
defendant was by registered mail addressed to her in New Jersey. Defen-
dant filed a plea in abatement and later a motion to erase on the ground
that the action could be maintained only if defendant were personally served
within Connecticut. Defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's answer was sus-
tained by the trial court. On appeal the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
in a unanimous opinion, reversed holding that constructive service on the
defendant in New Jersey was sufficient to give the Connecticut court juris-
diction over her person. Perlstein v. Perlstein, 204 A.2d 909 (Conn. 1964).
Under the United States Constitution a state can affect interests only
if it has jurisdiction.3 In order to annul a marriage, a court must have
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. In the instant case the
former presented no serious problem since it could have rested upon any
one of three independent bases. Initially, Connecticut was the state in
which plaintiff was domiciled at the time of the suit, and it is almost
universally held that the state of either party's domicile has jurisdiction to
1. The distinction between the terms "domicile" and "residence" should be noted.
"That is properly the domicile of a person where he has his true, fixed, permanent
home and principal establishment, and to which whenever he is absent, he has the
intention of returning." STORY, CONFLIc'r Or LAWS § 41 (8th ed. 1883). Residence,
on the other hand, is simply bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place with
no particular intention that the place of habitation shall be the permanent abode. Cf.
Newcomb's Estate, 192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 950 (1908). The particular significance
of this distinction is that one who is merely a resident of a particular state cannot,
without more, call upon its courts to annul his marriage, whereas one who is domiciled
in that state can do so. This holds true even though courts frequently speak of
annulling the marriage of a "resident." Cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942) ; Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d 872 (1937).
. 2. The source of a court's power to annul a marriage is a subject of some
dispute. Some states hold that a court has this power only if it is expressly conferred
by statute, see, e.g., Becker v. Becker, 58 App. Div. 374, 69 N.Y.S. 75 (1901), whereas
others hold that the power to annul resides in a court as a part of the general equity
power. See, e.g., Romatz v. Romatz, 355 Mich. 81, 94 N.W.2d 432 (1959).
3. RESTATEMENT (S]coND) CONFLICT or LAWS § 43 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
(574)
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annul the marriage.4 The rationale behind this rule is that the state of
present domicile has, as against all other possible forums, the greatest
interest in the domestic relations of its citizens. 5 Secondly, Connecticut
was the state where the marriage was celebrated. A substantial body of
authority 6 supports power to annul in this state on the theory that ".... the
incidents of the procuring of a license and the performance of the mar-
riage ceremony in this state give [its courts] jurisdiction of the subject
matter. . ... 7 Finally, Connecticut was the place of the parties' domicile
at the time they went through the marriage ceremony. Although no sound
reason appears why such a state should have jurisdiction, especially in
preference to the forums mentioned above, there is some authority to sup-
port such a position.8 Here however, the court specifically rested jurisdic-
tion on the first.9
There was a distinct problem, however, with respect to the court's
jurisdiction over defendant's person. Actions for divorce have traditionally
been considered in rem,10 the res being the marital status of the plaintiff.
Consequently, plaintiffs have been able to sue for divorce in the court of
their domicile upon constructive service on nonresident defendants." Such
service does not violate due process 12 and a decree rendered thereon is
entitled to full faith and credit.13 But, as the court admits,' 4 most courts
deny that jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in an annulment suit
can be acquired by any form of constructive service.' 5 These courts argue
that there is a fundamental distinction between an action for divorce and
one for annulment in that the former admits the existence of a marital
relationship, which is the res, and seeks to terminate it, whereas the latter
4. Gwin v. Gwin, 219 Ala. 552, 122 So. 648 (1929) ; McCormack v. McCormack,
175 Cal. 292, 165 Pac. 930 (1917) ; Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35 (1882) ; Christlieb v.
Christlieb, 71 Ind. App. 682, 125 N.E. 486 (1919) ; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206
N.Y. 341, 99 N.E. 845 (1912) ; Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500 (1910).
See also LnFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 170 (1959) ; Storke, Annulment in the Conflict
of Laws, 43 MINN. L. Rv. 849 (1959).
5. GOODRICH, CONFLICT op LAWS § 135, p. 268 (4th ed. 1964).
6. State ex rel. Pavlo v. Scoggin, 60 N.M. 111, 287 P,2d 998 (1955) ; Sawyer v.
Slack, 196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929) ; McDade v. McDade, 16 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929). Contra, Antoine v. Antoine, 132 Miss. 442, 96 So. 305 (1923);
Turner v. Turner, 85 N.H. 249, 157 At. 532 (1931). That the state of celebration
should have jurisdiction to annul is advocated in Storke, supra note 4, at 854.
7. State ex rel. Pavlo v. Scoggin, supra note 6, at 114, 287 P.2d at 1000.
8. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash. 89, 106 Pac. 500 (1910).
9. Perlstein v. Perlstein, 204 A.2d 909, 910 (Conn. 1964). For thorough dis-
cussions of the situation in England with respect to subject matter jurisdiction see
Falconbridge, Annulment Jurisdiction and Law: Void and Voidable Marriages,
26 CAN. B. Rnv. 907 (1946); Webb, The Twilight of the Doctrine of Inverclyde v.
Inverclyde, 4 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 557 (1955).
10. LEFLAR, supra note 4, §§ 25, 162; Storke, supra note 4, at 854-55.
11. Saul v. Saul, 122 F.2d 64 (1941) ; Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
12. Ibid.
13. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
14. Perlstein v. Perlstein, supra note 9, at 910.
15. Owen v. Owen, 127 Colo. 359, 257 P.2d 581 (1953); Cale v. Davis, 135 Ga.
185, 68 S.E. 1101 (1910); Gayle v. Gayle, 301 Ky. 613, 192 S.W.2d 821 (1946);
Cummington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223, 21 N.E. 435 (1889); Berlinsky v.
Berlinsky, 204 App. Div. 480, 198 N.Y.S. 402 (1923) ; Pepper v. Shearer, 48 S.C. 492,
26 S.E. 797 (1897).
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action is brought to establish that no such relationship ever came into
existence. The plaintiff in his petition, therefore is alleging that there is
no relationship, that is, no res upon which to base an action in rem. In
Gayle v. Gayle,16 the Kentucky Court of Appeals found this argument to
be fatal to the plaintiff's case. On facts almost identical to those in Perl-
stein, the court held that constructive service on a nonresident defendant
in an annulment suit did not confer personal jurisdiction on the court
because ". . . the very allegations of the petition preclude the existence
of the thing or res.'
u7
In Owen v. Owen"s the conservatrix of the estate of a mental in-
competent domiciled in Colorado, brought suit in a Colorado court for
annulment of the incompetent's purported marriage to defendant, a resident
of Texas, on the grounds that plaintiff's incompetent was insane when he
went through a marriage ceremony with defendant in Texas. Defendant
was personally served in Texas. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed
the trial court's action in quashing the summons for lack of personal juris-
diction. Plaintiff's argument that an annulment action is one in rem, the
res being the marital relationship which continues as a legal status until
set aside by judicial decree was rejected in favor of defendant's contention
that an annulment suit, unlike an action for divorce, is in personam and
that jurisdiction over a defendant can be obtained only by personal service
on him within the state or by his voluntary appearance in court. 19
Bisby v. Mould20 dealt with a state service of process statute2' which
provided that in certain enumerated cases, one of which was divorce,
service by publication on a nonresident defendant was proper if personal
service was not possible. Another statute22 provided that all provisions
relating to divorce also applied to actions for annulment. The court rea-
soned that the statute permitting constructive service must be strictly
construed and that since it provided for constructive service in only a few
enumerated cases, one being "divorce," this specific expression of legisla-
tive intent controlled the general expression of intent that annulment suits
should be governed by the same rules that governed divorce actions. Conse-
quently, the trial court's refusal to issue an order permitting service by
publication was affirmed. 23 That the court misconstrued the intent of the
16. 301 Ky. 613, 192 S.W.2d 821 (1946).
17. Id. at 615, 192 S.W.2d at 822. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reaffirmed its
position in Prothro v. Prothro, 265 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1953), wherein an annulment was
sought on the grounds of fraud.
18. 127 Colo. 359, 257 P.2d 581 (1953).
19. This case has been overruled by statute in Colorado. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 46, art. 3, § 5 (1953).
20. 138 Iowa 15, 115 N.W. 489 (1908).
21. IOWA ANN. CODE tit. 18, ch. 6, § 3534(8) (1897).
22. IowA ANN. COD9 tit. 16, ch. 3, § 3183 (1897).
23. Contra, Piper v. Piper, 46 Wash. 671, 91 Pac. 189 (1907). In this case plaintiff,
a domiciliary of Washington, sought an annulment on the ground that defendant's
marriage to her was bigamous. Not knowing defendant's present whereabouts, plaintiff
procured an order permitting service by publication on defendant's last known resi-
dence. The state of Washington intervened to prevent the prosecution of the annul-
ment proceedings on the ground that service by publication was not permissible in
such a suit. The trial court's dismissal of the action was reversed because the service
[VOL. 10
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law-makers is evident from the fact that the statute was subsequently
revised to specifically provide for constructive service on nonresident
defendants in annulment suits.
2 4
In Gee v. Gee 25 a resident of California brought suit for annulment
in a California court against a resident of Louisiana. Defendant in that
case was personally served with process in Louisiana. Holding for plaintiff
on defendant's motion to quash service the court said:
The action is one directly affecting the status of the parties and
involving the existence of a res or thing. The res is exactly the same
as that involved in an action for divorce, and the action and the judg-
ment should be held to be in rem to the same extent, for the same
reasons and to the same end and purpose.
2 6
The case for allowing constructive service is stronger where the
marriage sought to be annulled is "voidable" rather than "void." "In such
a case the very purpose of the action is to end an existing status which
would otherwise continue, rather than to declare that no such status ever
existed. '12 7 Thus, in the case of the voidable marriage there would appear
to be a sufficient res upon which to base an action in rem and so acquire
the right to use constructive service.
Although the court in the instant case distinguishes Mazzei v. Cantales2s
in which it was held that a court having subject matter jurisdiction by
reason of its being situate in the locus celebrationis cannot acquire per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by constructive service, at
least one case has held that such a court can so acquire jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant.
2 9
The court's decision in the instant case may be open to two objections,
both of which are rooted in the Constitution of the United States: first,
that the form of service permitted by the decision is in contravention of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment; second, that a decree
rendered on such service is not entitled to full faith and credit. Both these
objections have been dismissed in the case of divorce actions a0  Query,
then, whether the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the area of
divorce can be extrapolated into the area of annulment? This question
turns on whether there is a fundamental distinction between divorce
and annulment.
of process statute specifically authorized service by publication in the case of divorce
and the court found a general course of conduct on the part of the legislature to
treat divorce and annulment similarly.
24. IowA R. Civ. P. 60(i) provides:
After filing an affidavit that personal service cannot be had on an adverse party
in Iowa, the original notice may be served by publication, in any action brought:
(i) for divorce or ,separate maintenance or to modify a decree in such action,
or to annul an illegal marriage, against a defendant who is a nonresident of
Iowa or whose residence is unknown. (Emphasis added.)
25. 89 Cal. App. 2d 877, 202 P.2d 360 (1949).
26. Id. at 882, 202 P.2d at 364 (1949).
27. Buzzi v. Buzzi, 91 Cal. App. 2d 823, 825, 205 P.2d 1125, 1126 (1949).
28. 142 Conn. 173, 112 A.2d 205 (1955).
29. Becker v. Becker, 58 App. Div. 374, 69 N.Y.S. 75 (1901).
30. See notes 12-14 supra.
SPRING 1965]
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Where, as in the present case, jurisdiction to annul is based upon
plaintiff's being domiciled in the forum3 l consideration must be given to
Atherton v. Atherton8 2 which clearly holds that the state which has always
been the plaintiff's domicile and the only matrimonial domicile of the parties
can, on constructive service of a nonresident defendant, render a decree of
divorce which is as binding on the defendant as if he had been personally
served with process within the forum. The Court rests its decision on
certain language from the famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff,33 to wit:
... we do not mean to assert, by anything we have said, that a state
may not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its
citizens towards a nonresident, which would be binding within the
State, though made without service of process or personal notice to
the nonresident. The jurisdiction which every State possesses to
determine the civil status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves
authority to prescribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting
them may be commenced and carried on within its territory. The
State, for example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon
which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created,
and the causes for which it may be dissolved.
3 4
In Williams v. North Carolina 1, 3 5 in deciding that Nevada divorce
decrees rendered on constructive service of North Carolina defendants were
entitled to full faith and credit in North Carolina, Mr. Justice Douglas
reasoned that since each state has a legitimate concern in the marital status
of its citizens and since the marriage relation creates problems having wide
social significance, each state can alter within its own borders the marriage
status of the spouse domiciled there whether the other spouse is present or
not. No constitutional barrier is presented so long as the form of the con-
structive service satisfies the requirements of due process.36
Sufficient language has been quoted to illustrate that the Court's
emphasis in actions involving the marriage relation has been upon the
power of the state to determine the status of its citizens. So important,
in fact, does the Court consider this power that it has rejected for mar-
riage actions the traditional in rem-in personam dichotomy and has
announced that jurisdiction in such suits is based not upon the existence
of a res within the state but upon the fact that one of the parties to the
marriage is domiciled there.3 7 If this be the criterion, surely there is
greater need for the exercise of the state's power in the case of annulment
31. Where the court has jurisdiction to annul because it is sitting in the locus
celebrationis the case of Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901), is instructive. The Court
there said, "No valid divorce from the bond of matrimony can be decreed [on con-
structive service] by the courts of a State in which neither party is domiciled." Id. at
177. By parity of reasoning, then, it would seem that the Court would have the same
objection to a decree of annulment rendered on constructive service by the court of
the locus celebrationis unless, of course, one of the parties was domiciled in that state.
32. 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
33. 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878).
34. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 163 (1901).
35. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
36. Id. at 298-99.
37. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906) ; Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U.S. 287 (1942).
[VOL. 10
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than in divorce. A party seeking annulment contends that he is not
married; the records of the state, however, show that he is. Obviously his
situation is extremely doubtful. He dares not exercise the right of the
unmarried to take a spouse, because to do so would probably render him
liable to prosecution for bigamy. On the other hand, a party seeking
divorce is validly married and seeks only to terminate the existing rela-
tionship which has for one reason or another become distasteful to him.
In terms of social policy it seems more important that the state be able to
make certain the doubtful status of one of its citizens in order to permit him
to conduct his affairs on the basis of his true status than that it be empowered
to terminate a valid marriage relationship which. has become onerous.
None of the arguments advanced by those courts which distinguish
divorce and annulment suits for purposes of authorizing constructive
service onl nonresident defendants seem meritorious. They are based on
hypertechnical and unrealistic distinctions. A party suing for annulment
of his marriage is married in the eyes of the law until there is a judicial
determination otherwise. No serious contention can be made that the
allegations of his petition are sufficient to void his marriage or that a
determination of the court that the marriage is a nullity will at the same
time be a repudiation of the court's jurisdiction to. hear the case because
there was no res upon which to base jurisdiction.
It is submitted that Perlstein is to be applauded as a step out of a
murky thicket of legal formalism into the clear path of common sense.
Although presently in the numerical minority, the instant decision is in
accord with the better case law and the provisions of several alert and
progressive state legislative bodies.38
Edward C. Mengel, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - FELONY-MURDER - ROBBER CONVICTED OF MNNURDER
WHEN Co-FELON WAS KILLED BY VICTIM.
People v. Washington (Cal. 1964)
Defendant was convicted of robbery and felony-murder.1 He and the
decedent, his co-felon, had attempted to rob a service station. The owner
of the station, warned by shouts of "robbery" by either his employee or
38. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 22 (1957) ; PA. R. Civ. P. 1124(a) (3).
1. CAL. PENAL CODn § 189 (1872).
All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait,
torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or
which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,
SPRING 1965]
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the felons, took a gun from his desk. When the armed decedent entered
the office, he was fatally wounded by the owner. The unarmed defendant
was wounded while attempting to flee with the money.
The court, using the doctrine of proximate cause as expressed in
People v. Harrison,2 stated that it reasonably might or should have been
foreseen by the defendant that the commission of or the attempt to commit
the contemplated felony would be likely to create a situation which would
expose another to the danger of death at the hands of a nonparticipant in
the felony. His creation of such a situation was the proximate cause of the
death and the killing, and therefore was first degree murder .
The court rejected the argument that the killing was justifiable,
3
since the slayer's justification was personal to him and could not be used
as a shield by the defendant who was causally responsible for his co-felon's
death. Commonwealth v. Thomas4 was cited as authority although ex-
pressly overruled by Commonwealth v. Redline,5 the court stating that it
was more persuaded by the reasoning in the former.
The court also rejected the defendant's use of the doctrine of super-
vening cause and stated: "It is merely a normal human response for the
intended victim of a robbery, who is shot at or threatened by the robbers,
to return their fire and this is not a superseding cause." The appeal was
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under Section 288, is murder
of the first degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (1872).
Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or
confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the jury trying
the same....
This is similar to the Pennsylvania statute:
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4701 (1939).
All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying
in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing,
or which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate
any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first
degree. All other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree ...
Whoever is convicted of the crime of murder of the first degree is guilty
of a felony and shall be sentenced to suffer death in the manner provided by
law, or to undergo imprisonment for life, at the discretion of the jury trying
the case, which shall, in the manner hereinafter provided, fix the penalty.
2. People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1959). In this
case, defendants attempted to commit a robbery in a cleaning establishment. The
owner was killed by a shot fired by his employee who was shooting at one of
the defendants.
3. CAL. PENAL COD8 § 197 (1872), reads in the pertinent part:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the
following cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a
felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person, against
one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to
commit a felony. ...
4. 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
5. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
6. PERKINS, CRIINAL LAW 632 (1957).
[VOL. 10
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dismissed and the judgment affirmed. People v. Washington, 40 Cal. Rptr.
791 (1964).
In the case of Lord Dacres,7 considered one of the first important
articulations of the felony-murder doctrine,8 the defendant and some
friends went to hunt unlawfully in a forest. One hunter killed a keeper
who accosted him. The others took no part in the killing but were con-
victed of murder and the defendant was hanged. In accord with this, Coke
stated that a death resulting from an unlawful act was murder.9 The
limitation of the doctrine to felonies was introduced when Blackstone held
"... if one intends to do another felony, and undesignedly kills a man,
this is also murder."'10 Various statutory and judicial limitations have been
placed upon this early version in an attempt to narrow its application. One
method has been to restrict its application to those felonies which generally
endanger life, i.e., malum in se rather than malum prohibitum.1
The homicide statutes of California 12 and Pennsylvania 3 are mere
restatements of the common law and declare all felony murders to be in
the first degree. The New York statute, on the other hand, has redefined
the doctrine by limiting it to those "killings" committed "by a person"
engaged in a felony. 14 Such a limitation has enabled New York to avoid
such decisions as Thomas in Pennsylvania and Harrison and Washington
in California. Wisconsin has limited the doctrine by creating a third degree
murder offense, which provides for a penalty of not more than fifteen years'
imprisonment in excess of the maximum provided by law for the felony,
when the death is a natural and probable consequence of the felony.15
A narrower application has also been achieved by limiting the time during
which the felony can be said to be in the process of commission.
16
The basis of the felony-murder doctrine is constructive malice, the
effect of which is the imputation of the mens rea which is regarded as
essential to liability for murder. Classically, mens rea is the intention to
kill or to do an act intrinsically likely to kill. Such imputation of mens rea
of a felony to the killing is acknowledged to be a legal fiction. "The
felony-murder rule is thus a rule for establishing the mens rea of murder;
it is not a rule of causation, it does not bear upon the actus reus of
7. Lord Dacres Case, Moore K.B. 86, 72 Eng. Rep. 458 (1535).
8. Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA.
L. Rtv. 50 (1956).
9. 3 COKE; INST. 56 (1797).
10. 2 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIS 200-01 (Sharswood ed. 1881). See also, Regina
v. Serne, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1887) ; Rex v. Plummer, 12 Mod. 627, 88 Eng. Rep. 1565
(1699).
11. People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (1872).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1939).
14. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1044 (1909).
15. WIS. STAT. § 940.03 (1956).
16. CADMUS, The Beginning and End of Attempts and Felonies Under The
Statutory Felony Murder Doctrine, 51 DICK. L. Rzv. 12 (1946).
SPRING 1965]
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homicide.' 7  The seemingly logical conclusion which one must reach
through this approach that the mens rea of murder is identical with the
mens rea of larceny has been strongly criticized.' 8
To obtain a verdict of first degree murder in the cases in which a
co-felon is shot by a police officer,19 by a victim,2 0 by a co-felon other than
the one charged,2' or in which a co-felon meets death through his own
negligence, the courts have sought the aid of the tort theory of proximate
causation or natural and probable cause.22 This is known as the probable
consequences test; but the question of what constitutes a natural and
probable consequence is shrouded with uncertainty.2a The doctrine of
intervening cause is applied to show that the death was not the probable
consequence of the defendant's act.24 Here, the test of foreseeability is
used, that is, the defendant will be excused if he could not have foreseen
the intervention as the probable result of his action.25 Since this is a
question of fact to be determined by the jury, it has been observed that they
are being called upon to determine the impossible.
26
England has solved the problem of proximate causation by abolishing
the constructive malice rule and requiring the court to find the same malice
aforethought, express or implied, as is required for the killing to amount to
murder when not done in the furtherance of another offense.27 The MODEL
-PENAL CODE has rejected the felony-murder rule by creating a rebuttable
presumption that such recklessness and indifference exist "... if the actor
is engaged, or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape
or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary,
kidnapping or felonious escape."
'28
Although an all-out assault upon the felony-murder doctrine would be
timely, that group of cases in which a co-felon is shot by anyone other than
the accused represents the most unacceptable application of this rule. The
felony-murder doctrine in its original form has been severely criticized.
29
17. MORRIS, supra note 8, at 59.
18. Id. at 61.
19. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
20. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955) ; People v.
Washington, 40 Cal. Rptr. 791 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
21. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939).
22. The application of the proximate cause doctrine to the felony-murder rule is
not limited to cases in which a co-felon is killed, but its use in such cases presents the
most difficult problems.
23. Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony-Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q.
191, 201.
24. WHARTON, HomIcID4 § 358 (2d ed. 1875).
25. Id.
26. KENNY, OUTLINES OP CRIMINAL LAW 127 (12th ed. 1926); Lewitt, Cause,
Legal Cause and Proximate Cause, 21 MICH. L. Rv. 34 (1922) ; Beale, The Proxi-
mate Consequences'of an Act, 33 HARV. L. Rzv. 633 (1920).
27. ENGLISH HOMICIDe ACT, 1957, 5 & 6 ELIZ. II, c. 11.
28. MODEL PENAL COD § 201.2(1) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1962).
29. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 557
(1934) ; MacDbnald, The Felony-Murder Doctrine and Its Application Under the
New York Statutes, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 288 (1935).
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"Though the purpose of deterring the commission of certain felonies is
commendable, the means selected appears to be socially unwise and is
based on reasoning not free from substantial analytic and historical errors. 3 0
Malice should be proved, not inferred.3 '
The various limitations placed upon the doctrine are intended to
reduce the scope of liability for results that are unintended and only slightly
probable, and in this respect the problem of causality in torts and criminal
law is the same.3 2 However, in the vital respect that the grounds of policy
which must govern the scope and limits of liability are different, the
problem is not the same. When the courts came to the conclusion that
problems of causation were inherent in the application of the felony-
murder doctrine, the once simple rule became entangled with a multitude
of uncertainties.
As the MODEL PENAL CODE indicates, the deterrent effect of such a
decision is doubtful.33
• . . the increased punishment strikes at the wrong thing - not at
the harm intended, but at the slight chance an unintended greater
harm; and emotions of vengeance are an insufficient justification for
the fictional attribution of the mens rea of murder to one whose
desire was quite certainly not a desire to kill.
3 4
Such a decision weakens the force and gravity of the finding of first degree
murder for appreciably graver offenses.3 5
The majority has extended the felony murder doctrine beyond the
bounds of logical application and usefulness to society. In following the
decision in Commonwealth v. Thomas which was expressly overruled by
Redline, the court has dogmatically adhered to a doctrine which is neither
historically nor analytically justified. Such a decision is valueless and a
mockery of justice. It is submitted that a solution to these recurring
problems spawned by this archaic doctrine is to replace it with the re-
buttable presumption approach as expressed in the MODEL PENAL CODE. 3 6
If the defendant is unsuccessful in rebutting this presumption, his con-
viction would nevertheless be based upon a more substantial ground than
that of the tenuous felony-murder fiction.
John A. Luchsinger
30. Morris, supra note 8.
31. WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 59.
32. Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (Pts. 1-2), 37
CoLum. L. Rv. 701, 1261 (1937).
33. § 201.2(1) (b), comment (Tent. Draft No. 9,1959).
34. Morris, supra note 8, at 80.
35. 1 Russ.L, CRIME 563 (10th ed. 1950).
36. Op. cit. supra note 33, § 201.2(1) (b).
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FEDERAL COURTS - DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE - Ex PARTE
CONSULTATION WITH ATTORNEY IN RESPONSE TO MANDAMUS ACTION
CREATES OF COUNSEL RELATIONSHIP.
Barrack v. Van Dusen (3d Cir. 1964)
In October of 1960 an airplane, on a scheduled trip from Boston to
Philadelphia, plunged into Boston Harbor. As a result, a plethora of
actions were commenced against the owners and manufacturers of the
plane, as well as the maker of its engines. While the majority of litigants
brought suit in the United States District Court for Massachusetts, some
filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.1 All of the actions
pending in the latter court were assigned to Judge Francis L. Van Dusen.
The defendants in the Pennsylvania actions, for reasons of convenience,
moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer these actions to the Massa-
chusetts Court. Judge Van Dusen granted the motion2 and plaintiffs
petitioned for a writ of mandamus from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
to compel the reversal of the transfer order.
In response to the petition 3 the Court of Appeals ordered Van Dusen
to file an answer to the petitions. It subsequently held that he did not
have power to transfer the actions, 4 since they were not such as "might
have been brought" originally in Massachusetts because the plaintiffs were
not qualified to sue in Massachusetts as personal representatives at the
time the death actions were brought in Pennsylvania. 5
The defendants, including Judge Van Dusen, then obtained certiorari6
to the Supreme Court, which reversed the Court of Appeals and held that
the limiting words of § 1404(a) referred solely to the federal rules of
venue and persofial jurisdiction and not to any laws of the transferee state.
The case was then remanded to the District Court so that it might recon-
sider whether the criteria of convenience and fairness, as pointed out by
the Supreme Court, justified the transfer.
7
On remand to the District Court the plaintiffs petitioned Judge Van
Dusen to disqualify himself from sitting in any further proceedings in the
1. Popkin v. Eastern Airlines, 204 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
2. Ibid.
3. As indicated in a footnote by the court in the instant case, some of the petitions
described the writ sought as mandamus and prohibition and others as mandamus or
prohibition, or both. The court indicates that it will refer to mandamus as including
prohibition wherever appropriate.
4. In light of this the court left it open for Judge Van Dusen to reconsider the
transfer of the two personal injury suits.
5. Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1963).
6. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 372 U.S. 964 (1964).
7. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). For interesting discussions con-
cerning this phase of the litigation see, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV.
L. Rev. 143, 260 (1964) ; Note, 9 VILL. L. Rzv. 678 (1964).
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pending actions. Upon his refusal, plaintiffs addressed a mandamus peti-
tion to the Court of Appeals which sustained the petition and held that
Judge Van Dusen should not hear the motions to transfer or any other
subsequent phases of the litigation. Barrack v. Van Dusen, 33 U.S.L. WEEK
2304 (Dec. 16, 1964).
The basis for the Court of Appeals decision was that Judge Van
Dusen's relationship with the defendant's counsel established an involve-
ment which violated the purpose of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and thus compelled
his disqualification from any further aspects of the litigation. That sec-
tion provides as follows:
Any . . . judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
case in which he . . . has been of counsel . . . or is so related to or
connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper,
in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial ... or other proceeding therein.
The crucial question in construing the statute lies in determining what
"degree of involvement" is necessary to bring about an "of counsel"
relationship.
In the instant cases Van Dusen designated the attorneys for defendants
as his counsel to answer the petitions for mandamus regarding his transfer
order. Additionally he conferred with them regarding the response and
later joined as a petitioner in the certiorari application to the Supreme
Court. These were the factual bases for his disqualification. Initially the
decision of the Court of Appeals seems harsh and unwarranted, since the
Judge was merely following the Court's command to answer the mandamus
petition. Further analysis, however, demonstrates the necessity of the result.
Contrasting the degree of association in the current controversy which
gave birth to the "of counsel" relationship with other disqualification
cases reveals that the present decision is not a radical departure from
previous decisions construing the "of counsel" criteria. The same Third
Circuit had previously held8 that a district judge who had been district
attorney during a defendant's trial and conviction was disqualified as to
defendant's motion to vacate judgment. Additionally, in United States v.
Maher9 it held that a United States attorney was "of counsel" in all
criminal cases within his district regardless of the degree of direct involve-
ment and must disqualify himself upon becoming a federal judge. The
philosophy behind these cases was well stated by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia :10
The fundamental requirements of fairness in the performance of such
functions require at least that one who participates in a case on behalf
8. U.S. v. Vasilick, 160 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1947).
9. 88 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Me. 1950).
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of any party, whether actively or merely formally by being on plead-
ings or briefs, take no part in the decision of that case by any tribunal
on which he may thereafter sit.
Surely the degree of involvement and the directness of that involvement are
much more pronounced in the case at bar than in the aforementioned cases.
Here the Judge actively conferred with the defendant's attorney. In the
cited cases there was only a possibility of creating an "of counsel" relation-
ship, while here the involvement was direct and distinct.
A judge who is designated as a respondent in a mandamus proceed-
ing may retain any counsel he desires to represent him." If he employs
outside counsel he may freely discuss any or all issues of the case with him.
But where he retains counsel who already represents one or more parties
to -the litigation 12 and thereafter participates ex parte with such counsel
in preparing or advising as to the defense of the petition, he has most
definitely been "of counsel" and should be dismissed from the case. The
need for impartiality is exceedingly great in this particular phase of the
litigation since the essence of the instruction on remand from the Supreme
Court was that the District Court "weigh" certain factors in re-examining
the transfer petition.' 8 The delicate balancing involved in such discre-
tionary activity requires as complete assurance as possible that the scales
of justice will not be unevenly balanced in future aspects of the litigation.
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated, ". . . Justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.' 4 While the Court of Appeals' decision was un-
doubtedly a difficult one in light of its relationships with its judicial brethren,
it was none the less necessary for the preservation of judicial equality.
The validity of the instant decision becomes more readily apparent
upon examining Rule 20 of the proposed Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.15 This new rule would require the Court of Appeals to order
the judge as well as the other respondents to answer the petition within
a fixed time, but would permit the judge who does not desire to contest
the petition to so advise the clerk and parties by letter. In this event the
petition would not be taken as admitted by the judge's failure to answer.
The need for such an enlightened rule has been present for many years.
11. It is interesting to note that the modern use of the writ of mandamus has most
definitely expanded to take in the ". . . supervisory control of the District Courts
by the Courts of Appeals [which] is necessary to proper judicial administration in
the federal system." La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957).
12. In the case at bar, Judge Van Dusen was represented by William T. Coleman,
Jr., Esquire, who was an outside counsel.
13. The Supreme Court held that such a transfer would work no change in the
applicable substantive law and Massachusetts would have to apply the Pennsylvania
conflicts provision. The case was then remanded since this principle might affect such
elements as the feasibility of consolidating the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts cases,
the need for witnesses on various elements of damage and their convenience, and the
appropriateness of the trial of a diversity case in a forum familiar with the applicable
state law. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
14. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
15. See 34 F.R.D. 263, 294 (1964).
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In the great number of cases the trial court has no more concern in main-
taining the questioned order than in upholding one of its appealable orders;
the interest is professional and not personal or legal. In these cases the
judge is merely a formal party and thus should not be required to answer
the petition.1 6 Such was the Supreme Court's position in Ex parte Fahey :17
"Mandamus, prohibition and injunction against judges are drastic and
extraordinary remedies. . . . They have the unfortunate consequence of
making the judge a litigant, obliged to obtain personal counsel or to leave
his defense to one of the litigants before him." The adoption of the
Proposed Rule will serve to eliminate such purposeless litigation as is
involved in the instant case. Thus the court was entirely correct in adopt-
ing the philosophy behind the proposed legislation and applying it in the
pending cases.18 Simply because Judge Van Dusen was following a practice
that has prevailed for "more than a century" is no reason to condone
his actions.19
It has been suggested that the effect of the court's ruling will be to
allow a party to select his own judge and thus increase the burden on the
courts.20 The fallacy in such a premature worry, however, is apparent.
It is only in those specific instances where the trial judge selects counsel
from those attorneys litigating the case. and then actively consults and
advises with them that he should disqualify himself. If he fails to do so an
action such as that brought in the instant case is in order. Even at the
expense of "increasing the burden on already overburdened courts" a
litigant should be granted an impartial judiciary. This decisive factor was
properly recognized by the court in the present controversy. The Court
in sustaining the petition and removing Judge Van Dusen realistically
appraised and preserved the ultimate goal of "fairness in the judiciary" in
deciding a case of first impression in an enlightened fashion.
"The guiding consideration is that the administration of justice should
reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be so in fact." 2'
Arthur M. Goldberg
16. 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTic4 73 (2d ed. 1953).
17. 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1946).
18. "The rule of law must be tested by the philosophy of the subject ... we must be
students of reasons as well as of rules." WIGMORt, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS ii
(1st ed. 1928).
19. The fact that the Judge was merely following standard practice in answering
the petition is one of the grounds being used by Judge Van Dusen and his colleagues
on the District Court in seeking a review of the Court of Appeals decision. Philadelphia
Inquirer, Jan. 29, 1965, p. 9, col. 5.
20. Ibid.
21. Separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952).
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INSURANCE-DUTY TO DEFEND-INSURERS' UNCONDITIONAL TENDER
OF POLICY LIMITS INTO COURT DURING INTERPLEADER ACTION
TERMINATES THEIR DUTY To DEFEND AS TO ALL ACTIONS.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams (S.D. Ind. 1964)
Plaintiff insurance companies, having filed bonds for the full amount
of their respective policy limits, sought to join the assureds and several
hundred potential claimants as parties defendant in an interpleader action
based on the federal statute.' The basis for the multitude of lawsuits was
a gas explosion caused by the assureds' alleged unlawful storage of ex-
plosive gas on the premises, resulting in the deaths of seventy persons and
.injuries to over three hundred. The total policy limits of the three insurers
amounted to $1,020,000 while damages sought in the lawsuits filed at the
time of this action exceeded $11,000,000, with the remaining prospective
claims not having been instituted. The federal court in the Southern
District of Indiana held that the jurisdictional requirements for statutory
interpleader were met and that upon the unconditional tender of the
policy limits into court the insurers' duty to defend the assureds was
terminated as to all pending and future actions against their assureds
including this action. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp.
860 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
Interpleader is a well-established equitable remedy which existed long
before the enactment of the federal statute or the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. One of the purposes of statutory interpleader
is to establish an effective procedure by which insurers might be protected
from the hazards of multiple liability on their policies when the adverse
claimants are of diverse citizenship and not otherwise capable of being
brought under the jurisdiction of one court at the same time so as to deter-
mine the respective rights and liabilities of the parties. Its liberal provisions
as to jurisdiction, venue and nationwide service of process further demon-
strate the legislative intent that the statute was designed to aid the harassed
insurer in settling claims made under its policies.
Alternatively, Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure operates
to supplement the statute and its jurisdictional and procedural requirements
are the same as in any other federal civil action.2 Thus the essential differ-
ence between the two is to be found on the matter of jurisdiction. Statutory
interpleader is available if the amount in controversy exceeds $500 and
there are two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship. Conversely,
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1948). The statute basically requires two or more adverse
claimants of diverse citizenship who "are claiming or may claim" property of greater
than $500 in value which is in the hands of the stakeholder who upon instituting the
interpleader action must deposit the property into the court to abide its judgment. It
further provides that the claims need not have a common origin nor be identical so
long as they are adverse to and independent of one another.
. 2. Additionally, interpleader under Rule 22 will lie only when the claims of
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Rule 22 requires complete diversity of citizenship between the stakeholder
on the one hand and all of the claimants on the other with more than
$10,000 in controversy.
This interpleader action, being based on the statute, was within the
court's jurisdiction despite the fact that virtually all of the claimants were
citizens of Indiana since recent cases have held that "minimal diversity" is
sufficient to meet jurisdictional requirements.3 Furthermore the court found
the requisite adversity of claims by reasoning that since the claims far
exceed the policy limits each claimant will be interested in reducing or
defeating the claims of the other claimants so as to increase his propor-
tionate share in the limited proceeds to be distributed by the insurers.
4
However, to completely satisfy jurisdictional requirements, it was
necessary for the court to further determine that statutory interpleader
would lie even though the adverse tort claims were still unliquidated. At
the time of this action, over a hundred lawsuits had been filed against the
assureds none of which had been litigated nor reduced to judgment. On
this issue there is not complete unanimity among the federal courts. For
example, a federal district court in Ohio recently considered the same
issue and arrived at a completely different result.5  The present court
relied basically upon Pan American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Revere6 to reach
its conclusion. That case was a statutory interpleader action by an auto-
mobile liability insurer with the presence of a direct action statute being
the only distinguishable factor from the present case. In an exhaustive
opinion comparing the "may be exposed" clause of Rule 22 and the "may
claim" clause of the statute, District Judge Wright concluded that the
danger of exposure to multiple liability under Rule 22 need not be immediate
nor even reasonably probable but rather any possibility of having to face
claims in excess of policy limits, no matter how remote, would suffice to
meet the requirements of the rule.7 The holding in the present case is the
3. Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868 (1957) (Statutory interpleader was allowed
where the adverse groups of claimants were comprised of a Texas citizen on the one
hand opposed by three Texas citizens and one citizen from Tennessee on the other.
The stakeholder was a Texas bank.) ; Girard Trust Co. v. Vance, 5 F.R.D. 109 (E.D.
Pa. 1946). See the following notes approving the Haynes decision: 45 CALIF. L. Rzv.
543 (1957) ; 42 CORNELL L.Q. 570 (1957) ; 55 Micu. L. REv. 1183 (1957) ; 35 TEXAS
L. Rtv. 859 (1957) ; 43 VA. L. REv. 727 (1957).
4. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 863 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
5. In National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 230 F. Supp. 617
(N.D. Ohio 1964), an interpleader action brought by the insurer pursuant to Rule 22,
the court determined that the "or may be exposed to double or multiple liability"
clause of Rule 22 required a "reasonable probability" that the policy limits would be
exhausted by the claims and that until one of the claims is reduced to a judgment then
such reasonable probability could not be found to exist.
6. 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
7. Id. at 480. However, the Ohio District Court chose to ignore Revere and
relied exclusively on the other view found in American Indem. Co. v. Hale, 71 F.
Supp. 529 (W.D. Mo. 1947), which refused to restrain local proceedings and compel
the claimants to litigate in a federal court. There the insurer's policy limits were
$5,000 with claims exceeding $160,000. The court considered it mere speculation and
conjecture whether the judgments against the assured would exceed the policy limits -
a somewhat anomalous finding. The Ohio court found the presence of a direct action
statute in Revere and its absence in Hale and in Ohio to be the critical factor. But its
reasoning on this point is haphazard since the securing of a judgment against the
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better approach and is more in accord with the basic underlying view that
interpleader is remedial in its nature and should be liberally granted. The
preference for this holding is further strengthened by the express approval
given it by two of the foremost authorities on federal procedure.8
With the requirements for statutory interpleader being met, the court
turned next to the primary issue of the case - whether the insurers' duty
to defend the assureds in suits brought under their policies terminates
upon the payment of the policy limits into court.9 The answer turns on
whether the duty to defend is to be construed as being dependent on or
independent of the duty to indemnify. In discussing the confusion which
reigns in the federal courts on this issue, the court chose to follow the
reasoning of its own Court of Appeals in a previous case which construed
the clause "as respects insurance afforded by this policy" to have a limiting
effect which terminates the duty to defend when no further insurance is
afforded as a result of the payment of judgment or the settlement of claims.' 0
The court then concluded that the insurers' duty to defend terminated as
to all pending and future actions against their assureds, including this action,
upon their unconditional relinquishment of all interest in the stake." As a
result, the insurers were dropped from the interpleader action upon their
payment of the policy limits into court and the assureds were forced to
provide their own counsel for the action.
In effect then, the court held that where the damages sought exceed
the policy coverage the insurer could, as Appelman despairingly noted,
"walk into court, toss the amount of the policy on the table, and blithely
inform the insured that the rest was up to him."' 2 Such an extreme result
would seem to exceed even the wildest expectations of counsel for insur-
ance companies. They have continually argued that the duty to indemnify
assured which is not met results in the claimant having a direct action against the
insurer. A difference in time when the judgment is not satisfied should not be the
basis for denying the insurer the right to interplead the claimants.
8. See Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, 45 YALE; L.J. 1161, 1163-67
(1936), where Professor Chafee criticizes Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934
(8th Cir. 1934), upon which the Hale case substantially relied in reaching its result.
See Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 418-21,
where approval is given to Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 105 F.2d 578 (8th
Cir. 1939), which was also relied upon by the present court along with Revere in
granting interpleader. Finally, Professor Wright has expressly stated that inter-
pleader should lie for insurers even where the tort claims are unliquidated. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTs 279 (1963).
9. The policies on which the claims were based provided:
With respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy, the company shall:
(a) defend any suit against the insured ... even if such suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent; but the company may make such . . . settlement
of any claim or suit as it deems expedient ....
These provisions are identical to those adopted by the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters in 1955 as part of the standard liability insurance policy.
10. Denham v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1948). How-
ever, the insurer settled many of the claims directly and paid the balance up to the
policy limits into court to be allocated as the court might determine since the amount
of damages far exceeded the assured's policy limit. This was done for the purpose
of pro-rating the assets available to the claimants since the assured was not financially
able to pay the remaining claims.
11. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860, 867 (S.D. Ind. 1964).
12. 7A APPXLMAN, INSURANcn LAW AND PRACTICX § 4685, at 470 (1962).
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their assured is their primary obligation and that their duty to defend is
subordinate to and dependent thereon which terminates when the duty of
indemnity has been fulfilled. But never have they advocated, as this court
would seemingly permit, relief from their defense obligation merely by
tendering its policy limits into court.' 3 In construing the defense clause
as being designed for the protection of the insurer as a natural concomitant
of its duty to indemnify the assured and not as being independent of that
duty, the court thus extended the holdings of previous cases which had
similarly determined the duty to defend to be dependent on the duty to
indemnify, but which had never attempted to reach the result of the
present case.1
4
In complete contrast to this case, there is a view, deemed by some to
be the majority one, which declares that the obligation of the insurer to
defend suits brought under its policy is a valuable right of the assured
for which he pays and that such obligation is entirely independent of the
obligation to indemnify. 15 This view was completely adopted by the Ohio
district court in National Cas. Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America.'6
To further substantiate its holding, the court applied the rule of previous
Ohio cases which had held that the insurer is required to defend regardless
of the possible outcome of the action or the potential liability to the assured
if the petition stated a claim within the ambit of the policy.17 These cases
are clearly distinguishable, however, because in each the issue concerned
whether the petition stated a cause of action which, under the terms of
the policy, the insurer was bound to defend. There had been no tender
of the policy limits into court in an attempt to escape defending the assured
but rather the insurer was denying the duty to defend on the grounds that
the claimant's cause of action was outside the coverage of the policy.' 8
13. Des Champs, The Obligation of the Insurer to Defend Under Casualty Insur-
ance Policy Contracts, 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 580, 589 (1959).. 14. In Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939),
the first case to directly confront this issue, the court held that the duty to defend was
not independent of the duty to indemnify and that such duty terminated upon the
insurer's payment of a judgment -which exhausted the policy limits. In that case, the
insurer defended two actions brought by the injured plaintiff and his parent which
resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff in excess of the policy limits but a new trial
was ordered as to the parent's action. Upon paying the policy limits to satisfy the
plaintiff's judgment, the court held that the insurer would not have to defend the
assured in the subsequent new trial by the parent. However, the court strongly
intimated that a different result might occur if the insurer attempted to tender the
policy limits to the assured at the beginning of such actions and thus cast the entire
burden of defense upon his shoulders.
15. American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951).
16. 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Although the policy written by the
insurer was not before the court, it was assumed that the usual defense provisions
were contained therein.
17. Lessak v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 730 (1958)
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199
(1945); Bloom-Rosenblum-Kline Co. v. Union Indem. Co., 121 Ohio St. 220, 167
N.E. 884 (1929).
18. Thus it is clear that these Ohio cases stand only for the generally accepted
rule that the insurer's duty to defend is determined from the claimant's pleadings and
when the cagse of action is brought within the coverage of the policy the insurer
must defend the assured regardless of its ultimate liability to the assured.
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Because of this misapplication of Ohio law, the weight to be accorded
the National Cas. Co. decision is fairly debatable. Perhaps a better expres-
sion of this "majority" view may be found in American Employers Ins.
Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc.,19 wherein the court held the insurer
obligated to defend despite a prior exhaustion of policy limits by payment,
in the absence of policy language making the defense provisions dependent
upon exhaustion of the coverage. This was based on the notion that an
insurance policy, being a contract of adhesion, should be construed against
the insurer whenever a genuine ambiguity arises. But this should not
result in the straining of the meaning of the language in order to bind the
insurer nor to invent ambiguity where none exists.
20
In the final analysis, the strength of the "majority" view that the
duty to defend is independent of the duty to indemnify is materially
weakened by its reliance on the generally accepted rule that the duty to
defend is broader than the duty to pay ;21 moreover, its vitality is com-
pletely sapped when it interprets the defense provisions to be for the benefit
of the assured. First, the proposition that the obligation to defend is
broader than the obligation to indemnify relates particularly only to
groundless, false or even fraudulent lawsuits which the insurer is obligated
to defend if by the pleadings the claims come within the purview of the
coverage. Thus, it is on the issue of whether the cause of action is within
the terms of the policy to which this principle is properly restricted. Its
extension by some of the cases to the duty to defend where the policy
limits have been exhausted is erroneous and detracts substantially from
their validity.22 Secondly, the proposition that the defense provisions are
for the benefit of the assured may be refuted by reference to any standard
liability insurance policy which gives the insurer the absolute right and
control over the defense of the litigation and the freedom to negotiate any
settlements thereunder in good faith. Of course, the assured derives benefit
from this provision since it obviates the necessity of seeking counsel, but it
is the insurer's potential liability under the policy which makes its interest
in the outcome substantially greater than that of the assured and which
gives it the absolute control over the defense. Otherwise an assured facing
litigation where the damages sought are less than the policy limits would
19. 131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 205 Misc. 1066, appeal withdrawn, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835, 1 App.
Div. 2d 1008 (1954).
20. A question as to the validity of this case may be raised because of its failure
to consider the effect of the clause "as respects the insurance afforded by the other
terms of this policy." As noted before, the Denham case construed a similar clause
to be a limiting one. This seems to be the more reasonable interpretation.
21. Smith v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 161 So. 2d 903 (La. Ct. App. 1964)
Mead Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 167, 129 S.E.2d 162 (1962);
Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 321 P.2d 768 (1958) ; Goldberg v. Lumber-
men's Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131 (1948).
22. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d
393, 205 Misc. 1066, appeal withdrawn, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835, 1 App. Div. 2d 1008 (1954);
American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951).
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in effect be a disinterested party since there would be no danger of liability
accruing to him and the result could well be a haphazard defense leading
to the insurer's ultimate liability. Conversely, when the policy limits have
been exhausted by prior payments on judgments or settlements, the insurer
would then be a distinterested party as to the final result and could be
subject to charges of the unlawful practice of law.
23
It is clear that neither the approach adopted in the present case nor
the one used in National Cas. Co. is satisfactory. Under either approach
substantial hardship to one of the parties is the necessary result. Between
these two extreme positions, a better and more justiciable course is desir-
able. If it is admitted that the duty to defend is correlative with the duty
to indemnify, then it is possible to chart such a course from a re-examina-
tion of the first case which directly involved this issue, Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co. v. McCarthy.2 4 There the court admitted the interdependence
and co-extensiveness of the obligations to pay and defend and held that this
latter obligation continues until the duty of payment has been fully per-
formed. Furthermore, this duty would not be satisfied in the court's view
merely by tendering the policy limits into court nor may the insurer abandon
its defense in mid course under circumstances prejudicial to the rights
of the assured.
To illustrate this view, if the insurer is simultaneously required to
defend two claims against the assured both of which seek damages far in
excess of the policy limits and one claim results in a verdict for the claimant
which exhausts the policy limits, then the insurer should not be permitted,
by tendering the policy limit, to bow out in the middle of the pending suit
because of the necessary prejudice to the assured. Alternatively, if, as in
the McCarthy case, a judgment has been obtained which exceeds the policy
limits, then upon the payment by the insurer of the policy limits, it should
not be obligated to defend a subsequent action against the assured since
it would no longer have any financial interest in the outcome. Such a rule
requiring the insurer to undertake the defense of its assured until actual
settlement of claims or payment of judgments has exhausted the policy
limits and then permitting withdrawal provided no prejudice accrues to
the assured would be fair to both the insurer and the assured and would
obviate the hardships occurring under the other views. Furthermore, the
basic rule of contract law that a writing should be interpreted in a manner
which best reflects the actual intention of the parties would be achieved
since the clause "with respect to such insurance as is afforded by the policy"
is designed to limit the defense provisions up to the policy limits.
23. In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
24. 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939). See, supra, note 14. This case was subse-
quently approved in Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Peoples Wet Wash Laundry, 92
N.H. 260, 29 A.2d 418 (1942), and Travelers Indem. Co. v. New England Box Co.,
102 N.H. 380, 157 A.2d 765 (1960), with the latter case construing the clause "with
respect to such insurance as is afforded by this policy" to mean that the duty exists
only while "such insurance" is still afforded; i.e., it has not been paid out in satis-
faction of a claim.
20
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The future vitality of Commercial Union is questionable. On the
granting of statutory interpleader where the tort claims were unliquidated,
the court took a position which should gain greater acceptance by the
federal courts. On the "duty to defend" issue the court departed radically
from the mainstream of judicial thinking; however in so doing their liberal
interpretation has accomplished the purpose of statutory interpleader to
prevent harrassment of insurers. Whether a similar result would occur
if only one or two persons were suing the assured is uncertain.
Thomas J. Tomalis
LANDLORD AND TENANT - NOTICE OF TERMINATION IMPLIES
RIGHT OF LANDLORD TO EXHIBIT THE PREMISES IN A REASONABLE
MANNER.
Gronek v. Neuman (Ill. 1964)
After defendant lessee notified lessors of his intention to terminate his
month-to-month tenancy, he refused to allow the lessors to display the
premises to prospective tenants. The lessors sued to recover a month's rent
or damages for this refusal. The lessee maintained that he had not, by any
affirmative act on his part, prevented the lessors from finding a new tenant,
basing his refusal to permit inspection on his common law right of exclusive
possession and the absence of an agreement reserving such a right. In con-
struing the lease's notice provision, the Appellate Court of Illinois held
that, the lessor had an implied right to reasonably exhibit the premises and
imposed on the lessee a corresponding duty to permit such exhibition. It
further ruled that a breach of this duty subjects the lessee to liability for
a maximum of one month's rental if such loss were actually sustained by
the lessor. Gronek v. Neuman, 52 Ill. App. 2d 250, 201 N.E.2d 617 (1964).
This case was one of first impression in the Illinois and perhaps in any
appellate court of the United States.1 As such, its rationale must neces-
sarily be analyzed on the basis of analogies to, rather than strict compari-
sons with, general property concepts. Initially, since a tenant has a right
to exclusive possession of demised premises as against the whole world,
including the owner,2 the lessor retains no possessory rights over the
demised premises3 unless he reserves such rights by expressing in clear
1. Neither the court nor this author was able to find a case which was parallel.
Perhaps the limitation on damages is a deterrent to further action in appellate court.
2. Central Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of No. America,
136 Conn. 234, 70 A.2d 126 (1949) ; Wurm v. Allen Cadillac Co., 301 Mass. 413, 17
N.E.2d 305 (1938) ; Strand Enterprises, Inc. v. Turner, 233 Miss. 588, 78 So. 2d 769
(1955) ; Maas v. Platte Valley Irr. Dist., 167 Neb. 124, 91 N.W.2d 409 (1958)
Hickman v. Melson, 200 Va. 693, 107 S.E.2d 387 (1959).
3. 2 BLACKSTONt, COMM'NTARMS 180, 191 (1870).
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and definite terms the nature of the restriction.4 In the absence of such
restrictions the lessor's unauthorized entry constitutes a trespass quare
clausum fregit or its statutory equivalent; for such action the lessor would
be liable to the lessee for damages.5 Even where the lessee authorizes the
lessor to enter for certain purposes, the lessor may not exceed the license
given or enter in disregard of any condition imposed by the lessee.6
The lessor has a right to enter onto the demised premises for certain
limited purposes, including entry to demand rent or to levy a distress.7
While there is some authority granting the right to enter and make repairs
to avoid waste,8 generally, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
a lessor has no such right of entry during the termY He may not investigate
to determine if repairs are needed or even to make necessary repairs. 10
In some jurisdictions, however, the lessor is given the right to enter to
comply with police regulations imposing a duty on the owner by statute."
Additionally, there is a division of authority as to whether the lessor may
enter, when the lessee has abandoned the premises, to prevent harm to
the reversion.12 Summarizing therefore, it is obvious that the courts have
jealously protected the possessory rights of the lessee by both narrowly
construing'8 leases and by allowing few exceptions to the rule of exclusive
possession.
The court in the present case, by implication from the required notice
provision, found that the lessor was entitled to enter onto the demised
premises to reasonably exhibit them to prospective tenants. The obvious
reason for requiring notice from the lessee was to prevent hardship to the
lessor which would result from a hasty vacating of the premises. Neverthe-
less, this point, conceded by the defendant, does not necessarily require
the result found in Gronek. In First Natl Realty Corp. v. Oliver, 4 where
the lessor sued for an additional month's rent because of the lessee's failure
4. Johnson v. Mason, 226 Minn. 23, 31 N.W.2d 910 (1948) ; Eagle Spring Water
Co. v. Webb & Knapp, Inc., 236 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
5. University Apts., Inc. v. Uhler, 84 Ga. App. 720, 67 S.E.2d 201 (1951)
Peterson v. Vak, 169 Neb. 441, 100 N.W.2d 44 (1959); McGuire v. Corn, 92 Ohio
App. 445, 110 N.E.2d 809 (1952).
6. Snedecor v. Pope, 143 Ala. 275, 39 So. 318 (1905); Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.
App, 2d 54, 179 P.2d 41 (1947).
7. Sproul v. Gilbert, 226 Ore. 392, 359 P.2d 543 (1961); 1 TIFv.NY, REAL.
PROPXRTY 94 (3d ed. 1939).
8. Ibid.
9. Johnson v. Kurn, 95 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1938); Zwerin v. Geiss, 38 Misc. 2d
306, 237 N.Y.S.2d 280 (N.Y. City Ct. 1963).
10. See, 32 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 196 (1941).
11. Benjamin v. Kimble, 43 Misc. 2d 497, 251 N.Y.S.2d 708 (1964) ; Sunderman
v. Warnken, 251 Wis. 471, 29 N.W.2d 496 (1947).
12. Corwin v. Hamilton, 154 Cal. App. 2d 829, 317 P.2d 139 (1957), wherein it
is stated at 142, "... the owner of property which is leased, has a right to come on
the property if he finds that the tenants have moved, and take steps to protect his
property .. " But cf. First Stamford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pierce, 161 Misc.
756, 293 N.Y.S. 75 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937), at 79. "An entry by the landlord before the
expiration of a term on premises demised is unlawful, though the tenant has removed
from the premises, unless such right is reserved."
13. See, 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 232 (1947).
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to give notice as required by statute, the court interpreted the legislative
intent of the statute: "while a tenant who fails to give notice may be liable
for another month's rent, the purpose of the Code section is not to penalize
the tenant but to give the landlord an opportunity to find a new tenant."' 5
The court in the instant case argues that such purpose would be frustrated
if it were not accompanied by a right in the lessor to enter and exhibit the
premises since few prospective tenants would be interested in property they
could not inspect. The general rule of caveat emptor would apply; in the
absence of misrepresentation or concealment there would be no implied
warranty of fitness for purpose intended or tenantable conditions.',
The court, earlier in the opinion, had restated the principle that a
lessor's invasion of the lessee's possessory rights constituted a trespass,
but limited this idea to cases of "senseless intrusion." It went on to state:
"We cannot conceive of substantial interference with the tenant's enjoy-
ment of the premises by his cooperation in permitting the premises to be
shown at his convenience. . . . An action at law lies for the breach of this
duty.' 7 Here the court speaks of cooperation and permission of the lessee
and yet simultaneously imposes an involuntary duty upon him. The lan-
guage concerning substantial interference of the lessee's enjoyment seems
out of point. The lessee is defending his rights against the lessor on the
basis of trespass, not for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
There is no need for an act to be a substantial interference with the offended
party's rights to constitute a trespass.
As the dissent states: "The tenant is under no obligation to permit
the lessor to disturb his possession, enjoyment, and use during his tenancy,
by showing the premises to prospective tenants. . ". .",i This is the more
acceptable view in that it denies any duty by the lessee and speaks not of
substantial interference, but of disturbance of his rights. This is consistent
with the common law concept of trespass.
It is submitted that such a right should not be given to the lessor.
Allowing it is against all precedent and contrary to the rules of construc-
tion of leases; it would have been simple for the lessor to reserve this right. 19
The court, by allowing this exception to the rule of exclusive possession,
is impugning the right of the lessee to hold the premises "as he would
have . . . if he had purchased the fee simple title to the land.
'20
J. Edmund Mullin
15. Id. at 327.
16. See, 51 C...S. Landlord and Tenant § 303 (1947).
17. Gronek v. Neuman, 52 Ill. App. 2d 250, 201 N.E.2d 617 (1964). (Emphasis
added).
18. Id. at 619. (Emphasis added).
19. See, e.g., the following excerpt from a form lease printed by Yeo and Lukens
Co., 11 N. 13th St., Phila., Pa.: "... 6th. The lessor reserves the right at all times to
visit and inspect the demised premises, personally or by agent, and to cause any
repairs to be made which he may deem proper; also the right at any time to put up a
'For Sale' sign in such place on the premises as he may elect, and a 'For Rent' sign
immediately, in case notice to quit is given. Prospective purchasers or tenants
authorized by Lessor may inspect the premises at reasonable hours at any time."
20. Galley v. Hedrick, 127 S.W.2d 978, 981 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
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LOTTERIES - CONSIDERATION NOT SATISFIED BY BENEFITS FLOWING
TO THE PROMISOR OR BY MERE INCONVENIENCE OR DISADVANTAGE
TO PROMISEE.
People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc. (Ill. 1964)
Defendant, operator of thirteen retail food markets, initiated into his
business a "game" known as "Split the Dollar." Each time a person visited
one of the defendant's stores he could procure, free of charge, a coin which
when opened would reveal a number, for example, 1-2-3-6-9. When the
person had collected numbers that combined to read 1-9-6-2 or 1-9-6-3, he
was then qualified to receive a one dollar award for the first combination or
a one hundred dollar award for the second. The prize was awarded in
the event that he could correctly answer a question. Supposedly more
arduous questions had to be dealt with when one was striving for the
one hundred dollar award. It was necessary to visit one of the defendant's
stores in order to gain possession of one of the split dollars; but the dis-
tribution was limited to one per person and there was no requirement of
purchase or passage through a check-out counter in order for one to become
eligible for a prize.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing the lower decision,' strictly
construed the Illinois statute prohibiting lotteries 2 and held that since there
was no "paid or promised consideration" in the transaction, there was no
lottery. People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 473 (Ill. 1964).
Since the term "lottery" has no explicit meaning in the law, general
usage is usually relied upon to furnish its definition and elements. The
term is generic in creation and probably best left without exact definition
since, "no sooner is it defined by a court than ingenuity evolves some
scheme within the mischief discussed, but not quite within the letter of the
definition given."'3 The only restriction that has been agreed upon is that
the three elements of chance, prize, and consideration must be present in
order to constitute a lottery.4 Consideration has become the most popular
1. People v. Eagle Food Center, Inc, 46 Ill. App. 2d 24, 196 N.E.2d 366 (1964).
2. ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-2(b) (1961). A "lottery" is any scheme or pro-
cedure whereby one or more prizes are distributed by chance among persons who paid
or promised consideration for a chance to win such prizes, whether such scheme or
procedure is called a lottery, raffle, gift, sale or some other name. (Emphasis added.)
Actually, the defendant was found guilty of conducting a lottery in violation of
ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 38 § 28-1(a)(7) and fined two hundred dollars. But the issue
remained whether the scheme conducted by the defendant was a lottery as defined
by the statute.
3. People v. McPhee, 139 Mich. 687, 103 N.W. 174, 176 (1905).
4. But see, Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 111 A.2d 4 (1955).
A food store wished to adopt a plan by which persons entering the store would
register their names, have the names placed in a box and then have prizes given to
those persons whose names were withdrawn. There was no requirement that the
person be present at the drawing in order to receive a prize, nor was a purchase at
the store required. It was argued by the plaintiff that the absence of actual payment
of consideration for participation and the absence of the requirement that the winner
be present at the drawing put the activity outside the scope of the statute. CON N. GtN.
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means for escape from the characterization of lottery because anything of
value constitutes a prize5 and even though "skill" is distinguished from
"chance," any need for a great degree of skill in a promotion scheme would
decrease the number of participants. 6
There are three distinct views as to the meaning of consideration when
applied to this problem. One is that there must be actual payment of con-
sideration and that mere incidental benefits flowing to the merchant in the
form of increased sales is not enough.7 Another defines consideration
according to the contractual theory, that is, where one does something
he is not legally bound to do or refrains from something he is legally free
to do.8 Finally, there is the view that no consideration in any form is
required - that the aggregate of prize and chance alone produces a desire
"to get something for nothing" and that that result, per se, is contrary to
public policy as embodied in the prohibition of "lotteries."
Before the instant decision, it was considered safe to assume that an
activity such as "Split the Dollar" would have been prohibited as a lottery
in Illinois. An earlier Illinois decision' ° held that a gas and oil distributor's
scheme for promoting business by distributing cards which qualified the
holder to participate in a drawing for a cash prize at the end of each month
was illegal as a lottery. It reached this result despite the fact that the plan
contemplated the free distribution of cards to any auto owner request-
ing them.
Another Illinois case" concerned an advertising scheme given the
designation of "Bank Night." Under this plan, any person could register
for a prize at plaintiff's theatre without buying a ticket or giving considera-
tion of any kind. The winner did not have to be inside the theatre, but any
winner did have to reach the stage in three minutes in order to claim his
prize. The plaintiff admitted the existence of prize and chance, but con-
STAT. § 8667 (1949). The court held that neither the payment of consideration nor
the possibility of a public gathering were essential; any scheme wherein chance is the
predominant factor constitutes a lottery.
5. Baedaro v. Caldwell, 156 Neb. 489, 56 N.W.2d 706 (1953) (free game on a
pin ball machine) ; Carl Co. v. Lennon, 86 Misc. 255, 148 N.Y. Supp. 375 (Sup. Ct.
1914) (one dollar's worth of goods).
6. Meyer, Analysis of Business Lotteries and Promotions in Nebraska, 34 Nza.
L. Rjv. 447 (1955). See also, People v. Monroe, 349 I1. 270, 182 N.E. 439 (1932).
"... the word chance means something that befalls as a result of unknown or uncon-
sidered forces, the issue of uncertain conditions, a fortuity," and Commonwealth v.
Lake, 317 Mass. 264, 57 N.E.2d 923 (1944). Usually the element of chance has to
predominate over any element of skill.
7. People v. Cardas, 137 Cal. App. 788, 28 P.2d 99 (1933) ; State v. Hundling,
220 Iowa 1369, 264 N.W. 608 (1936); Commonwealth v. Malco-Memphis Theatres,
293 Ky. 531, 169 S.W.2d 596 (1943).
8. Central States Theatres Corp. v. Patz, 11 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Iowa 1935);
Affiliated Enterprises v. Waller, 40 Del. 28, 5 A.2d 257 (1939) ; Maughs v. Porter,
157 Va. 415, 161 S.E. 242 (1931) ; State ex rel. Regez v. Blumer, 236 Wisc. 129,
294 N.W. 491 (1940).
9. State ex rel. Hunter v. Omaha Motion Picture Exhibitors Ass'n, 139 Neb.
312, 297 N.W. 547 (1941) ; Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, supra n.4.
10. Jones v. Smith Oil and Refining Co., 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N.E.2d 42 (1938).
11. Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N.E.2d 648 (1937). It was
emphasized that this case came before the court by way of managers seeking aid from
a court of equity which had granted an injunction rather than as a criminal prosecution.
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tended that the element of consideration was lacking because persons not
attending the theatre and who paid no admission fee had a chance to win.
The court found that "Bank Night" was a lottery, stating: "It is certain
that the prize money came from the pockets of those who patronized the
theatre, and that without patrons there would be no prizes. In actual opera-
tion, those who paid to get in, paid for those on the outside in so far as
those on the outside had a chance to win, and the giving of free chances to
those who did not come in could not alter the basic and essential character
of the transaction....
The common law view of lotteries in Illinois was reinforced by a 1963
case' 3 holding that:
"Valuable consideration" as an element of a lottery consists of some
right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some for-
bearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered or under-
taken by the other and it is immaterial whether one party sustains
an actual pecuniary loss or the other an actual pecuniary benefit.' 4
Following the ostensible dictate of Illinois law in this area, the Appel-
late Court resolved the instant case in predictable fashion.15 It held that a
scheme which involved a person obtaining qualifying numerals as a result
of many visits to defendant's grocery store and answering questions to
obtain a cash award was a lottery under the statute. In its effort to
enunciate a definitive meaning of "consideration," the court said, "the time
and effort involved in making many visits to one of defendant's markets
to obtain numerals to qualify for obtaining cash awards and the advantage
to the defendant obtained by numerous persons making frequent visits to
the markets constituted consideration within the lottery statute and the
plan is an illegal lottery."' 0
In the light of this apparently cloudless state of the law, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that "Split the Dollar"
was not an illegal lottery since the element of "consideration" could not be
found in indirect benefits accruing to the storeowner or in the physical
efforts expended by its customers to obtain the split dollars. The court
noted that the acquisition of merchandise did not enhance the opportunity
to win a prize; that food prices had not been raised nor quantity or quality
lowered; and that the money given away was derived from the profits of
the store. Obviously, the court concluded, "the purpose of the program
was to attract new customers and to stimulate more frequent visits and
purchases by established trade.'
7
12. Supra note 11, at 651.
13. Midwest T.V., Inc. v. Waller, 44 Ill. App. 2d 401,194 N.E.2d 653 (1963).
14. Supra note 13, at 653.
15. People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 46 Ill. App. 2d 24, 196 N.E.2d 366 (1964).
16. Supra note 15, at 366.
17. People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., ... Ill. . . , 202 N.E.2d 473 (1964).
Many states handle this type of situation with gift enterprise provisions in their
statutes. The gift enterprise reads consideration as passing in connection with the
purchase of merchandise rather than the outright purchase of a lottery ticket. See
Annot., 39 A.L.R. 1035 (1925).
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But the nexus of the court's decision was their contention that prior
to the 1961 statute 8 there was no statutory definition of lottery and that
although the common law had been codified by the statute in question, the
words "paid or promised consideration" required a new determination
as to the meaning of the element of consideration. 19 "A penal statute," the
court stated, "is to be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and nothing
is to be taken by intendment or implication against him beyond the obvious
or literal meaning of such statutes."2 0 The court in applying this rule to
the words of the lottery statutes relating to consideration found that benefits
flowing to the promisor did not constitute necessary consideration. 21 Using
stronger language the court said, ". . . it would be stretching the statute to
the breaking point, to construe it as meaning to embrace the technical
concepts of consideration applicable in the law of contracts." 2
2
The dissent23 agreed that the new Illinois statute was a codification
of the common law. Furthermore, it examined the common law24 and found
it to be most favorable to its opinion. The dissent stated that even if the
statutory definition of lottery required more than consideration in the con-
tractual sense, the concrete effort required of the promisee in the present
case fulfilled the requirement.
25
The differing views espoused by the Appellate and Supreme courts of
Illinois present the dilemma confronting many of our courts in deciding
what constitutes consideration in a lottery. The answer to the quandry
might be best served by referring to the motivation behind the prohibition
of lotteries. The existence of such prohibitions is based on the cupidity,
jealousy, and envy that result from such schemes and sought to be avoided
by an enlightened public policy. Add to this the need to protect the public
from the possibility of inferior goods being grudgingly accepted in lieu of
the ancillary benefits that might arise from such a scheme and one recog-
nizes the need to ground the rule on effect rather than technique. The
appellate court's result is more suitable to the above analysis. It attacks
the effect of a lottery while disregarding the manipulations of clever people
attempting to avoid the prohibition. Its conclusion is that the definition of
a lottery must remain under a penumbra in order for effective statutory
control.
18. Supra note 2.
19. See Midwest T.V., Inc. v. Waller, 44 Il1. App. 2d 401, 194 N.E.2d 653, 657
(1963). This court rejected this precise reasoning saying, "We certainly may not
assume . . . the legislature intended to depart from or alter the public policy of this
state toward gambling .... Absence of any language limiting the 'consideration paid
or promised' to money would seem to indicate legislative recognition of the fact that
promoters of lotteries resort to unpredictable schemes designed to conceal the elements
of consideration. Thus the definition of consideration must remain flexible." The court
adopted the concept that "if the controlling inducement is lure of an uncertain prize,
then the business is a lottery."
20. People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 202 N.E.2d 473 (Ill. 1964).
21. Supra note 20, at 475.
22. Supra note 20, at 476.
23. Justices Schaefer-and Underwood dissented.
24. Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256, 8 N.E.2d 648 (1937).
25. Supra note 20, at 476.
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The other argument, as exemplified by the instant case, is based on
a reluctance to apply the strict discipline of the lottery law to business
situations. There are myriad techniques by which a concern meets its com-
petition. Some may attempt to attract customers by staging a performance
by a talented entertainer, while others may give away prizes. In the frame-
work of the commercial world this type of activity is not equivalent to the
operation envisaged as an evil begetting lottery. Realistically, "Split the
Dollar," is just another means of advertisement, analogous to newspaper
ads or radio commercials. The rule that the court is trying to pronounce
is that a game of chance used as an extension of a business is allowable,
but, a business that acts as an extension of a game of chance is not. The
court is not abdicating its power over lotteries; it is adopting a sane
approach to the ramifications of a competitive system. If the decision is
read with regard to this economic background, it does not denude the lottery
law of its power; it only places it in its proper perspective when applied to
the business community.
Jeffrey Averett Brodkin
PRICE DISCRIMINATION - ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT - DEMON-
STRABLE CONSUMER PREFERENCE IS DISTINGUISHING FACTOR UNDER
LIKE GRADE AND QUALITY OF SECTION 2(a).
Borden v. F.T.C. (5th Cir. 1964)
Petitioner, a corporation engaged in the manufacture, processing, dis-
tribution and sale of food, dairy and chemical products, was charged by
the Federal Trade Commission' with price discrimination in violation of
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.
2
Petitioner sold its own label evaporated milk on a delivered price basis
which was uniform throughout the country. It also sold private label
evaporated milk, under labels owned by its customer, on an F.O.B. plant
basis, with prices determined under a cost-plus formula which was always
substantially lower than Petitioner's own brand price. As a result of an
expansion by Petitiorier of its private label operations into two areas that it
1. Hereinafter cited as Commission.
2. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), which provides in relevant
part: "It shall be unlawful . . .to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality . . .where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce ... "
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had not previously served, it obtained some private label business that had
been served by other packers.
The private label milk sold by Petitioner was chemically identical to
its brand milk and was packed in the same way except that private labels
belonging to the customer were attached, instead of Petitioner's own label.
The Commission charged that Petitioner had discriminated between pur-
chasers of products of like grade and quality as prohibited by the Act. A
cease and desist order was issued and litigation ensued.
3
Petitioner contended that since the grade and quality of a product
might vary because of "demonstrable consumer preference," there was no
violation of the Act because the jurisdictional requirement of "like grade
and quality" had not been met. The Commission rejected this defense
basing its determination of "like grade and quality" solely on the physical
properties of the products without regard to their brand names or their
relative public acceptance.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the
manufacturer's evaporated milk which bore its own label, and manuface-
turer's milk which bore private labels, were not products of "like grade
and quality" within the Robinson-Patman Act provision prohibiting price
discrimination between different purchasers of commodities of like grade
and quality, where the manufacturer's brand name had demonstrable com-
mercial significance. Borden Company v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 133 (5th
Cir. 1964).
The Robinson-Patman Amendment, enacted in 1936, is aimed at the
practice of price discrimination. It does not arbitrarily prohibit all price
discrimination; Section 2(a) confines the statute to price discriminations
"between purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality." This legis-
lation prohibited price discriminations with adverse competitive effects,
4
but excepted differentials "on account of differences in the grade, quality,
or quantity of the commodity sold." 5 Under the Act, the determination
of "like grade and quality" is a jurisdictional requirement. Any legally
cognizable difference in either grade or quality of a product supposedly
makes the Act inapplicable.
3. The Hearing Examiner found Borden had discriminated, but that this practice
had not injured competition, and that the difference in price had been cost justified.
He ordered the complaint dismissed, but the Commission reversed the examiner and
found potential injury in both the primary and secondary lines of competition and
rejected Borden's cost justification defense.
4. The purpose of price discrimination legislation is to protect the livelihood
of independent businessmen who must deal in the market place with large chains.
The ability of the chain store to obtain goods at lower cost than independents is an
outstanding feature of the growth and development of chain stores, which facilitates
the destruction of the competitive market. Without the restriction of a price dis-
crimination law, a chain store could completely dominate a market, with eventual
adverse effects on all phases of the economy.
5. "It is of course, clear that the 'like grade and quality' concept is relevant
solely to compare two or more items sold by one seller to his several customers, and
not to measure the similarity of his goods with those of a competitor." Report of the
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There are many references to the concept of "like grade and quality"
in Congressional hearings and debates, 6 Commission cases and court cases,
but there is relatively little illuminative material as to the correct meaning
of the term, or the criteria to be used in determining what goods are within
its scope.
The prevailing doctrine as to determining "like grade and quality" is
that applied by the Commission, that is, a physical comparison test. The
Commission takes the position that products manufactured of the same
substance with the same care for the same consumer purpose are of "like
grade and quality" irrespective of the fact that some are sold under the
manufacturer's own brand, while some are sold under the purchaser's
private brand.7
The Commission considers this test to be the most effective means of
implementing the intent of the legislators. By subjecting the goods to an
analysis of their physical components, the Commission can easily determine
whether the products are the same. At the present time, keeping in mind
both the basic purpose of the statute and the difficulties encountered in a
determination of "like grade and quality," the physical comparison test is
the best proposed.
The major objection to this test has been that it does not recognize
business actualities, more specifically, economic differences due to significant
consumer preference. Its critics emphasize that in some industries heavy
national advertising and sales promotions have cultivated significant con-
sumer preference in the brand-conscious American public. Therefore, they
conclude that a price discrimination law can consider heavily advertised
and anonymous or private-brand merchandise on an equal footing only at a
serious distortion of economic facts and that economic differences should be
evaluated under the statutory term "grade," as distinct from any purely
physical consideration of "quality."
The reason the commission has retained the physical-comparison test
has been that its
• ..abandonment in favor of a marketing comparison test of intrin-
sically identical goods [which would evaluate brand name as a factor]
might not only enmesh the administrators of the statute in complex
economic investigations for every price discrimination charge, but would
6. See, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 421 (1936).
7. Champion Spark Plug v. F.T.C., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953); Standard Oil Co.,
49 F.T.C. 923 (1953) ; International Salt Co., 49 F.T.C. 138 (1952) ; U.S. Rubber Co.,
46 F.T.C. 998 (1950); E. Edelman & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978 (1955). There are few
court cases that have dealt with this problem, but those that have, have accepted the
Commission's approach and have applied the physical-comparison test. Bruce's Juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949) ; Moog Industries, Inc. v.
F.T.C., 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F.
Supp. 436 (N.D. II1. 1941).
8. This is the minority opinion as expressed in the Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws 158 (1955).
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also encourage easy evasion of the statute through artificial variations
in the packaging, advertising or design of goods which the seller wishes
to distribute at different prices.9
In the present case, the Fifth Circuit recognized consumer preference
as a factor to be considered under "like grade and quality." The court
rejected the physical-comparison test in favor of a marketing comparison
standard, and stated that "consideration must be given to all commercially
significant distinctions which affect market value, whether they be physical
or promotional." 10
Apparently the court did not recognize the ramifications of its rejection
of the established policy of the Commission and the courts in applying the
physical-comparison test. That test had been formulated to prevent the
complete emasculation of the statute by those who would make artificial
distinctions in their products to circumvent its "like grade and quality"
requirement. The decision in the instant case will allow just such avoidance
of the statute that the Commission intended to prevent.
The Court stated that "the legislative history of the Act is of little
assistance on this point," and completely dismissed it. Although correct in
its statement that there is little to be found in the legislative history, the
court has treated this history very lightly in dismissing it so abruptly.
Evidence found in the Congressional Hearings and Debates does demon-
strate that the wording was carefully chosen to prevent the result herein
reached. The addition of the word "brand" to the requirement of "like
grade and quality" was initially proposed in order to protect the distribution
of privately branded products. The draftsmen of the Act denounced the
proposal as "a specious suggestion that would destroy entirely the efficacy
of the bill against larger buyers" who could negotiate for a special brand
on top of a price concession from the seller." Yet the Borden court found
it possible to discard legislative intent and accomplish a result diametrically
opposed to that intent.1
2
In the mind of the public, consumer preference, manifest in brand
name, is an intangible ingredient that differentiates one product from an-
other. The legislature realized that economically, brand names may differ-
entiate products, but nevertheless rejected a consideration of economic
9. Ibid. The Commission also points out that these factors can be considered
under the injury or cost justification provisions of the statute.
10. Borden Company v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 133, 137 (5th Cir. 1964).
11. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 421 (1936). Other instances
in the legislative history where additions to this provision were discussed and rejected
include: 80 CONG. REc. 8115 (1936) ; 80 CONG. REc. 8234-235 (1936) ; H.R. REP. Nos.
2287, 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
12. "The purpose of the proposed legislation is to restore, so far as possible,
equality of opportunity in business . . . by protecting trade and commerce against . ..
unlawful price discrimination, and also against restraint and monopoly for the better
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factors that would render ineffective a strong price discrimination law.
Brand names should be significant factors in justifying price discrimina-
tions only when a manufacturer or supplier can show that the cost of pro-
motion of the brand name has caused the price difference. The legislature
gave the manufacturer the benefit of a justifiable price discrimination under
the cost justification defense of the statute13 which recognizes promotion
costs within its scope. The manufacturer, therefore, can get the benefit of
his consumer preference without circumventing the jurisdictional require-
ment of the statute. If the price discrimination cannot be justified under
the defenses within the statute, 14 the practice is unlawful and should
be prohibited.
By including "demonstrable consumer preference" in the jurisdictional
test of the statute, the court has permitted the large manufacturer who
commands a consumer preference, to change the label on his product, lower
the price in a specific area for the private label product, and completely
annihilate local competition. There can be no check on the price discrimina-
tion since the manufacturer can show "demonstrable consumer preference"
due to brand name, which makes one product different from the other.'
This is the result the legislature feared - an emasculation of the statute.16
The court, in an attempt to further justify its position, stated that
the Commission recognizes consumer preference under the "meeting com-
petition" defense of Section 2(b), and continued: "We cannot approve of
the Commission's construing the Act inconsistently from one case to the
next as appears most advantageous to its position in a particular case.' 17
13. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958), providing in relevant part: "That nothing herein
contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or
quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered."
14. Other defenses within the statute are within § 13(a), if it can be shown that
there is no injury to competition; and § 13(b), which permits discrimination "made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor."
15. An example of this practice is illustrated in 49 Nw. U.L. Rvv. 225, at 231
n.43 (1955) : "This so-called 'private brand' selling is illustrated by the case of a tire
manufacturer who sells tires to mail order houses or chain stores at lower prices than
it sells tires of like grade and quality to independent dealers or retailers (assuming
no cost justifications). The subterfuge is consummated by putting the favored buyer's
own brand name or trademark on the lower-priced tires, while other tires are sold
under the manufacturer's standard label. When the consumer public learns that the
two brands of tires do not differ in grade and quality, and consequently, when con-
sumer preference is motivated by price differential rather than by brand name, the
effects of discrimination became most injurious to non-favored buyers." See, Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936), 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939) (under original section 2 of the Clayton Act).
16. It should also be noted that under this interpretation of "like grade and
quality," cases that have ,been hailed as the foundation of the price discrimination area
would be erroneous. E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936), 101
F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939) ; U.S. Rubber Co., 46
F.T.C. 998 (1950); Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953); E. Edelman v. F.T.C.,
51 F.T.C. 978, 239 F.2d 152 (1956) ; Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Mfg. Co., 71 F.2d 768
(8th Cir. 1934).
17. 339 F.2d 133, at 138, stating: "The Commission has given full recognition to
the significance of higher prices commended by premium products in holding that a
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Superficially the fact that the Commission denies the recognition of con-
sumer preference under Section 2 (a), and recognizes it under Section 2 (b),
appears inconsistent ;18 however, an analysis of the underlying philosophy
of the Act shows this not to be the case. The purpose of the Act is to
restore equality of opportunity to independent businessmen. This is accom-
plished by proscribing direct and indirect price discriminations which can-
not be justified by cost differentials, meeting competition in good faith or
by changing market conditions. 1 Section 2(a) is directed at secondary
line competition, as well as at primary line competition as was the original
section of the Clayton Act. Through its denial of recognition of consumer
preference under this section, the Commission has prevented an avoidance
of the jurisdictional requirement of the Act, thereby strengthening it and
securing the scope of those who come within its provisions. Section 2(b)
is directed at primary-line competition; its defense of "meeting competition
in good faith" was expressly created by the Act for the benefit of manu-
facturers. If consumer preference were not recognized here, the mantl-
facturer who is selling the consumer preferred article could match exactly
the price of the local manufacturer and assert Section 2(b) as his defense.
If this were accepted the large manufacturer would have frustrated the
purpose of the statute since he is effectively undercutting his competitor.
By recognizing consumer preference under Section 2(b), the Commission
is consistent in its policy of preventing circumvention of the legislative
intent to protect independent manufacturers, producers and businessmen.
The court states that its decision is in harmony with the "broader
antitrust policies handed down by Congress," 20 but it fails to enunciate
what these policies are. It has been the long-established responsibility of
our Judicial system to implement the law as it has been enacted by Con-
gress and as evidenced by legislative history. Here the court has dismissed
that history and taken upon itself the responsibility of determining what
was intended, and reached a result contrary to legislative intent. The
ramifications of this decision may render ineffective the entire Robinson-
Patman Act. It cannot be too strongly urged that the courts investigate the
purpose of the Act before discarding case precedent and reversing legis-
lative policy.
Joseph A. Tate
seller who reduces the price of his premium product to the level of his nonpremium
competitors is not merely meeting competition, but undercutting it," citing Callaway
Mills Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. Ph. 16800 (F.T.C., Feb. 10, 1964), and Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957).
18. Other legal theorists, who have found this inconsistency are: Rowe, Price
Differentials and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patinan
Act, 66 YALt L.J. 1 (1956), at 17; and the minority of Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.
19. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) and (b).
20. 339 F.2d 133, at 136.
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SALES - WARRANTY - EMPLOYEE WHO PURCHASED WINE Is "BUYER"
WITHIN WARRANTY PROVISIONS OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-318.
Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Company (Pa. 1964)
Plaintiff, a hotel manager, personally purchased four bottles of cham-
pagne from a state liquor store on behalf of his employer. The wine was
intended for consumption by guests at a wedding party at the hotel. While
plaintiff and other employees were preparing to serve the wine, a cap
suddenly ejected and struck plaintiff in the eye, resulting in serious injury.
Plaintiff instituted suit against defendant, the producer and bottler of the
wine, alleging breach of implied warranties that the goods: (1) were
adequately and safely packaged and, (2) were fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods were sold. The complaint Was dismissed on the
ground that plaintiff was not within the scope of the statutory warranty
protection,' as defined in a recent case.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, reversing the decision, held plaintiff could maintain the
action as a "buyer" within the statutory term.3 Yentzer v. Taylor Wine
Company, 414 Pa. 272, 199 A.2d 463 (1964).
Historically, the concept of warranty has been a rather ambivalent
creature of the law. Though initially conceived as a tort, somewhat in the
nature of deceit, it arose primarily in contracts of sale. Because a warranty,
as distinguished from deceit, could arise from an innocent misrepresenta-
tion, the implication of warranties in the contract of sale was facilitated.
Courts reasoned that "a purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article"4
and imposed on the seller an obligation to provide such an article, merely
from the existence of the contract. 5 The warranty concept, being thus
absorbed into the law of contracts, was subjected to traditional privity
limitations, that is, the purchaser alone could maintain an action for breach,
and that, only against his immediate vendor. This dual limitation being
imposed, warranty protection was extremely limited.6
Though it seemed'settled that the warranty concept was contractual,
further scrutiny revealed a similar anomaly in respect to the harm consequent
from a breach of warranty. When personal injury to the purchaser resulted,
the courts recognized that such harm was of the type traditionally com-
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 2-318 (Supp., 1963).
2. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation, 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 2-103 (Supp., 1963).
4. Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 145, 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47 (1815).
5. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv.
117, 118 (1943).
6. Cf. Note, Legislation, 15 U. PITT. L. Rzv. 331, 352 (1954).
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pensated by tort liability. Negligence counts were often incorporated when
suits were instituted on warranties. Such counts, however, were generally
subjected to similar privity limitations. In 1916, in MacPherson v. Buick
Motors Co.,7 "the assault upon the citadel of privity" was commenced
when a duty was recognized between a manufacturer and a remote vendee
of an article which "is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril
when negligently made." 9 Though the privity limitation was thus pierced,
the purchaser yet had the burden of showing negligence on the manufac-
turer's part, often a difficult task. But the law concerning manufacturer's
liability to the ultimate consumer proceeded at an intense pace and cur-
rently appears as an almost generic concept, involving many distinct policy
considerations from those involved in ordinary negligence actions or previ-
ous warranty actions, and often imposing absolute liability.10
7. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
8. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
9. MacPherson v. Buick Motors Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916).
10. For an excellent survey of the products liability area, see generally, James,
Products Liability (Pts. 1-2), 34 TEXAS L. REv. 44, 192 (1955) ; Prosser, The Assault
Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), recognizing
this area of products liability as a "most radical and spectacular development in tort
law during this century," proposes a special classification:
§ 402A. Special Liability Of Seller Of Product To User Or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
The section proposes the suggested generic concept which, if adopted by the courts
would impose absolute liability in a situation such as the main case. Some of the
Reporter's comments bear directly on the problems here involved:
Comment (g)
• ..No reason is apparent for distinguishing between the product itself and
the container in which it is supplied; and the two are purchased by the user
or consumer as an integrated whole. When the container is unreasonably
dangerous, the product is sold in a defective condition. Thus a carbonated bev-
erage in a bottle which is so weak, or cracked, or jagged at the edges, or bot-
tled under such excessive pressure that it may explode or otherwise cause harm
to the person who handles it, is in a defective and dangerous condition ...
Comment (I) User or Consumer
• .. It is not even necessary that he shall have purchased the product at all.
He may be a member of the family of the final purchaser, or his employee,
or a guest at his table, or a mere donee. The liability stated is one in tort,
and does not require any contractual relation, or privity of contract, between
the plaintiff and the defendant. (Emphasis added.)
Comment (m)
... There is nothing in this section which would prevent any court from
treating the rule stated as a matter of "warranty" to the consumer. But if
this is done, it should be recognized and understood that the "warranty" is a
very different kind of warranty from those usually found in the sale of goods,
[VOL. 10
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The social policy which gave rise to the duty in the manufacturer's
liability cases proceeded from considerations of the practical workings of
our mass production and distribution methods. Recognizing that the ulti-
mate consumer was obviously the one most likely to be affected by a faulty
product and that it had become impossible for the consumer to deal directly
with the manufacturer, many courts found it necessary to discard the
privity limitation as outmoded and inappropriate for actions based on
negligence in manufacture.
In conjunction with modern distribution processes, there necessarily
arose mass media advertising methods. Such advertising, being directed at
consumers, provided the means for New York to evade the privity limita-
tion when a consumer sought compensation from a remote vendor for the
decrease in value of a defective product. This expansion was made in a
suit couched in the clear language of express warranty." The further
expansion to absorb implied warranties within the same reasoning appears,
in effect, to have been taken by at least one court. 12 In any event, the
Pennsylvania rule seems established that a manufacturer will be held strictly
liable to consumers for harm resulting from a defective product, at least
in food cases.
13
The progressive depletion of the efficacy of the privity limitation thus
becomes apparent. But, discussion to this point has dealt only with parties
directly in the distributive chain. Courts have been even more hesitant
to extend warranty protection to collateral parties, that is, non-purchasers
who have suffered harm from the breach. Here again, some inroads have
been made, though limited primarily to food cases. It is interesting to
and it is not subject to the various contract rules which have grown up
to surround such sales.
The Reporter further notes that such liability has been extended beyond those
products designed for "intimate bodily use" to the following, among others:
Animal food: McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
Automobiles: Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 559 (1959)
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 158, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) ; Duck-
worth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888 (Pa. 1962).
Tires: B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959).
Steering gear: Magee v. General Motors, 124 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1954).
Airplanes: Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d
81 (1963).
Airplane instrument: Taylerson v. American Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
Grinding wheels: Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575
(1959).
Insecticide spray: McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Conn. 1960).
Combination Power tool: Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 899
(Cal. 1963).
Chair: Thomas v. Leary, 15 App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962).
11. Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Corp., 11 N.Y.2d 53, 181 N.E.2d
399 (1962).
12. Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
13. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation, 409 Pa. 610, 614, 187 A.2d 575, 578
(1963). The court there relied on Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pgh., 102
Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atd. 537 (1931) Catani v. Swift and Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atd. 931
(1915). Cf. PROSS4R, TORTS, ch. 19, § 97, 3d ed. (1964).
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note that the harm suffered by collateral parties would almost necessarily
be personal injury, which is very closely associated with tort liability. It
seems this made social policy a prime factor motivating the courts to seek
a means to evade the privity limitation and grant recovery.
14
Several theories were proposed by the courts for sustaining this ex-
pansion, the most notable of which was the recognition of a wife as an
agent in purchasing food for family consumption, thereby permitting re-
covery by members of the family. 15 That the expansion involved a true
exercise in "legal gymnastics" is emphasized by the fact that when the wife
suffered harm, she was considered the buyer.16 The principal case repre-
sents a continuation of such gymnastics in a statutory context.
17
The Uniform Commercial Code sought to clarify this area of the law
by its provisions concerning the beneficiaries of warranties. 18 The exten-
sion of warranty coverage to include the buyer's family and household, as
well as guests in his home is limited by two considerations: (1) the harm
must be personal injury, and (2) use of the product by this plaintiff must
have been foreseeable. Such limitations clearly indicate an undercurrent
of social policy in accord with those general theories of tort liability. The
comments to the section') indicate that its purpose is to eliminate "technical
14. Cf. James, Products Liability II, 34 TEXAS L. Rv. 192, 193-96. For a dis-
cussion of some policy considerations involved in this expansion, see Note, 26 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 352 (1951), which deals with the 1950 Uniform Commercial Code.
15. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931)
Visusil v. W. T. Grant Co., 253 App. Div. 736, 300 N.Y. Supp. 652 (1937) ; Vaccarino
v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A.2d 316 (1943).
16. Cf. Prosser, The Assualt Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability To The Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1118 (1960).
17. Whether the plaintiff in the main case could be considered a "buyer" within
the statutory language (infra n.21) is a proposition open to severe criticism as will
be noted in the text infra.
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person
who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if
it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by
the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
19. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, comment 2, states in pertinent part:
The purpose of this section is to give the buyer's family, household and guests
the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received in the contract of the
sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any technical rules as to
"privity." It seeks to accomplish this purpose without any derogation of any
right or remedy resting on negligence. . . . Implicit in the section is that any
beneficiary of a warranty may bring a direct action for breach of warranty
against the seller whose warranty extends to him.
Comment 3 states:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family,
household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section is neutral and
is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the
seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in
the distributive chain.
The court, in applying the section, recognized that the Pennsylvania rule would
extend warranty protection to the plaintiff's employer. If plaintiff falls within the
section as a beneficiary, in light of comment 3 he would be a proper party to main-
tain suit against a defendant, a remote vendor. The court did not rely on this since
they considered plaintiff a "buyer" within the statutory language.
[VOL. 10
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rules of privity" insofar as the named beneficiaries are concerned. There
is little doubt that it is effective so far as it goes ;20 the question remains
whether it has gone far enough. In light of the manipulations executed by
the court in the main case, it seems their answer, at least, would be in
the negative.
The precise problem presented to the court in the instant case was
whether the policy behind the Code's elimination of technical privity bar-
riers to recovery by collateral parties at the consumer level should be
applied at an earlier step in the distributive chain. It appears that the
court decided this in the affirmative, then proceeded to distort the statutory
language to justify the result. The justification was effected through the
interpretation of the statutory term "buyer" 21 in a manner broad enough
to encompass the plaintiff, who had merely performed the physical act of
buying for his employer. Thus, in the court's opinion, the plaintiff was,
rather than an excluded collateral party, the party directly in the distribu-
tive chain.22 Such interpretation can only lead to results quite as anomalous
as arose from considering a wife an agent in the "food cases."
'23
The case was distinguished from the recent Pennsylvania decision in
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corporation,24 where recovery was denied an
employee who brought a warranty action in a similar situation. The dis-
tinguishing factor was that the plaintiff in Hochgertel had not performed
the physical act of purchase. There, the court was rather emphatic in deny-
ing recovery, relying on Loch v. Confair25 for the "inescapable con-
clusion . . . that no warranty will be implied in favor of one who is not
in the category of a purchaser. '26 Yet, in the instant case, the court
attempts to evade the effect of their own words through a perversion of
the statutory language. The dissent of Mr. Justice Eagen, in the main
case, inadvertently points out the perversion by contending that plaintiff
was not within the term "purchaser" 27 since he acquired "no interest in
20. See, e.g., Allen v. Savage Arms Corp., 52 Luz. Leg. Reg. Reports 159 (Pa.
C.P., 1962); but cf. Kaczmarkiewicz v. J. A. Williams Co., 13 Pa. D.&C.2d 14
(Pa. C.P., 1957).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-103 (Supp., 1963), defines "buyer" as "a person
who buys or contracts to buy."
22. When this is considered within the context of the statute, PA. STAr. ANN.
tit. 12A, § 2-318 (Supp., 1963), which extends warranty protection to ". . . any
natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer, or who is a guest
in his home. . .. " the fallacy of such interpretation becomes clear. Certainly it is not
the employee's household the statute seeks to protect.
23. See cases cited supra, n.15; Cf. PROSSER, op. cit. supra, n.16.
24. 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963), Noted in 25 U. PITT. L. REv. 99 (1963).
25. 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949). The plaintiff had removed a bottle of ginger
ale, manufactured by defendant, from a shelf in a super market when it exploded and
glass stuck in his wife's' leg. Recovery was denied because no contract had been
completed.
26. 409 Pa. 610, 615, 187 A.2d 575, 578 (1963).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-201 (Supp., 1963)
(32) "Purchase" includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage,
pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction
creating an interest in property. (Emphasis added.)
(33) "Purchaser" means a person who takes by purchase.
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the property. '28 The term used by the section under consideration 9 is
"buyer" and not "purchaser" so reliance on the latter term was improper.
However, it seems clear that the term "buyer" applies only to Article 2,
covering sales of goods, while "purchaser" applies to the various other
transactions covered by the Code generally.3 0
One subsequent case in Pennsylvania3' recognized the main case as
a severe threat to the rule announced in Hochgertel. While recognizing
that the main case "formally reaffirmed" Hochgertel the court continued,
stating, "the Yentzer case foreshadows perhaps the ultimate decay of the
limitation recognized in Hochgertel.'3 2 In light of such an interpretation
of the main case, the court felt themselves constrained to hold, as a matter
of law, that an employee, under facts similar to Hochgertel, could not
maintain the action on the warranty count. However, this determination
was effected by means of an "interlocutory summary adjudication" 33 limit-
ing the issues for trial to the negligence count. The court noted that such
determination "has the virtue that if subsequent developments in this
changing area of Pennsylvania law make it appropriate, the conclusion here
reached may be reconsidered at the pre-trial conference or at the trial."34
A recent California cases5 extended warranty coverage to an employee
of the purchaser in the absence of any statutory expansion. Though they
relied on a rather loose definition of privity, that is, successive right to
possession and use, the court reasoned that such employee was a member
of the buyer's industrial family to whom harm could reasonably be foreseen
and so should be protected.3 6 Thus the court arrived at a result comparable
to the main case by pure judicial expansion. Although the propriety of the
industrial family concept is questionable at best, and would appear a simi-
larly unwarranted expansion of statutory language should the Pennsylvania
courts seek to so construe their provision, 87 it is submitted that the same
policy considerations motivated both courts. With the statute conferring
protection on collateral parties at the consumer level, an analogous argument
extending coverage to employees, such as the plaintiff in the main case, who
will almost necessarily handle the articles, does not appear unwarranted.1
38
28. 414 Pa. 272, 276, 199 A.2d 463, 465 (1964).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (Supp., 1963). The section is quoted
supra, n.18.
30. This would appear to be borne out not only by the definitions, quoted supra,
n.21 and n.27, but also by the fact that the definition of "purchaser" appears in article
I of the Code, "General Provisions" while the definition of "buyer" appears in article 2,
the Sales article.
31. Driver v. F. A. Mitchell Co., 35 F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa., 1964).
32. 35 F.R.D. at 227.
33. FEw. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
34. 35 F.R.D. at 227.
35. Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823
(1961).
36. 190 Cal. App. 2d at 43, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
37. See supra, n.18.
38. In similar cases, recovery was denied because of the "employee limitation"
where granting recovery would appear a more equitable solution. Cf. Green v. Equitable
Powder Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Ark. 1950); Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,
135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955) ; Duart v. Axton-Cross Co., 19 Conn. Supp.
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The comments to the section 9 indicate an intent not to limit the
developing case law extending coverage to remote parties in the distribu-
tive chain. This does not seem to imply that the drafters did intend to
limit any collateral expansion, in fact, it is submitted, the opposite would
be the more logical inference in light of the general tenor of the provision.
It is submitted that a statutory amendment should be formulated; if the
courts wish to expand coverage in the interim, they should do so expressly
and not attempt to camouflage the expansion in such verbiage as will render
the statute quite as anomalous as the prior case law.
Richard H. Zamboldi
USURY - BROKERAGE COMMISSION - LENDER WHO DEALT THROUGH
MORTGAGE BROKER Is SUBJECT To DEFENSE OF USURIOUS COM-
MISSION DESPITE ABSENCE OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OR BENEFIT.
Busk v. Hoard (Wash. 1964)
Plaintiff mortgagee, responding to a broker's newspaper advertisement
offering investments in real estate mortgages and contracts, made $7,500
available for such a transaction with the defendant mortgagors. The nego-
tiations were handled through the broker, who received a $1,500 commis-
sion for procuring the funds for the borrowers. When this foreclosure
action was instituted by the lender, the defense of usury was raised by
the defendants, who claimed that the broker's commission taken together
with the contracted interest of ten percent exceeded the statutory limits.'
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed plaintiff's judgment for the
unpaid balance on the mortgage,2 holding that the combination of con-
188, 110 A.2d 647 (C.P. 1954) ; Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576
(1923) ; Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617 (1935).
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318, comment 3.
1. REv. CODE OF WASH. ANN. tit. 19, ch. 19.52.020 (1961), provides:
Any rate of interest not exceeding twelve percent per annum agreed to in
writing by the parties to the contract, shall be legal, and no person shall directly
or indirectly take or receive in money, goods or thing in action, or in any other
way, any greater interest, sum or value for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or thing in action than twelve percent per annum.
2. The contract to pay $7,500 to the lender was not rendered void but, pursuant
to REv. CODE oF WASH. ANN. tit. 19, ch. 19.52.030 (1961), the court took the net
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tracted interest and the commission together was usurious and that the
lender, as principal to the broker,3 was subject to the defense of usury
even though he had no actual knowledge of or benefit from the commission
paid by the borrowers. 4 Busk v. Hoard, 396 P.2d 171 (Wash. 1964).
Usury is one of the oldest problems of civilization. Originally, it,
applied to the exaction of any interest on the use of property. As far back
as the Old Testament the practict was forbidden as unbrotherly ;5 Aristotle
condemned it as unnatural ;6 Shakespeare poignantly emphasized its tend-
ency to become a forfeiture ;7 it was prohibited by the early laws of the
Chinese and Hindus as well as by the Koran; among the Romans interest
charges were limited by the Twelve Tables ;s and the Roman Catholic
Church after the Reformation, while approving of interest charges in gen-
eral, qualified that approval to moderate rates guided by equity and charity.9
Aside from legislative regulation of maximum charges, conventional
mortgage interest rates are determined almost completely by market con-
ditions. "While possibly justifiable in times of national emergency, .. .
arbitrary price-fixing, both from the economic and the moral standpoints,
represents a philosophy generally at odds with the concept of a private-
enterprise peacetime economy."' 0 Nevertheless, usury statutes in general
have been upheld as a valid exercise of the state police power for the
protection of public interests and promotion of the general welfare."
proceeds which had actually gone to the borrower ($6,000), and deducted the com-
mission paid to the broker and double the amount of interest already paid as well as
all unpaid interest as penalties so that the lender recovered less than half of his
original investment.
3. The finding of agency was justified on the basis of Comment 1(b), RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) AGENCY § 1 (1958), which provides that ". . . an agency exists
although the parties did not call it agency and did not intend the legal consequences
of the relation to follow" as long as the required factual elements existed. In finding
the presence of these factual elements, the court stressed that the plaintiff was a
carpenter who had no knowledge of mortgage transactions, never having invested
before; that the broker had selected the borrower, prepared all the required papers
and obtained the necessary title insurance; and, finally, that the broker followed up all
the collections until default, at which time he sent notice of intent to foreclose to
the borrowers.
4. The four dissenting justices, however, viewed the transaction as a purchase of
the debt from the broker, emphasizing the lack of intent by the plaintiff to commit
usury. They also held that a lender does not make a broker his agent merely by
turning over money to him to be transmitted to the borrower and accepting in return
a note and mortgage in which he is designated as payee and mortgagee. They relied
upon Clemson X. Best, 174 Wash. 601, 25 P.2d 1032 (1933), in which there was no
agency relation between lender and broker, and, consequently, no usury.
5. Exodus 22:25-7; Leviticus 25:35-7; Deuteronomy 23:20.
6. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I, ch. 10 (Bolland ed. 1877).
7. THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act IV, Scene 1, 190-211 (Bigelow, Smith &
Co., 1909).
8. 91 C.J.S. Usury § 2 (1955).
9. 8 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 77 (1912). See generally Meth, A Contemporary
Crisis: The Problem of Usury in the United States, 44 A.B.A.J. 637 (1958).
10. Prather, Mortgage Loans and the Usuary Laws, 16 Bus. LAW. 181, 183 (1960).
11. Wessell v. Timberlake, 95 Ohio St. 21, 116 N.E. 43 (1916) ; John Eichleay,
Jr. Co. v. Antonoplos, 309 Pa. 411, 164 Atd. 343 (1932), appeal dismissed, 289 U.S.
703 (1932) ; State ex rel. Ornstine v. Cary, 126 Wis. 135, 105 N.W. 792 (1905), writ
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Today, all but two states have usury laws with maximum rates
varying from six to thirty per cent and penalties for violation including
forfeiture of all interest, possibly deducted from the principal, total loss of
the right to recover on the usurious contract, and even fines and imprison-
ment. 12 Although the primary target of such statutes undoubtedly is the
loan-shark racket, 13 the problem of usury has arisen in many other areas.
As can be seen from the principal case, a finding of usury and the
placement of responsibility therefor are two separate and often difficult
problems to resolve.
The existence of usury laws has sparked the development of numerous
subterfuges in order to impart an air of legitimacy to certain borrowing
transactions. Evasive tactics include discounts, bonuses, commissions, extra
charges of all sorts, brokerage fees, procuring fees,* attorney's fees and
side agreements. 14 Generally a court, in determining whether a contract
or transaction is usurious, will disregard its form and look to its substance,
condemning it upon finding elements of usury present, regardless of the
disguises they may wear. 15 Although usury is a statutory matter, it has
certain basic elements:
These requisites are: (1) An unlawful intent; (2) the subject-matter
must be money or money's equivalent; (3) a loan or forbearance;
(4) the sum loaned must be absolutely, not contingently, repayable;
(5) and there must be an exaction for the use of the loan in excess
of what is allowed by law. If all these requisites are found to be
present, the transaction will be condemned as usurious .... "I
Consequently, this defense may be raised when the total of all charges,
placement fees and commissions plus the interest set forth in the instru-
ment exceed the statutory maximum and are all chargeable to the same
individual with or without an agency relationship. Obviously a lender
cannot be charged with usury on account of any commission paid by the
borrower to his own agent or to an independent broker for services in
negotiating or procuring the loan.
1"
12. For a graphic survey of state usury statutes see Comment, 10 CLEV.-MAR. L.
Riv. 343, at 361 (1961).
13. For a vivid description of loan shark interest rates (up to 272%), techniques
and collection methods see Alaniz, Texas Loan Shark Technique Described by State
Representative, 14 PFRs. FIN. L.Q.R. 142 (1960).
14. Meth, supra note 9. See also Collins, Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws,
8 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 54 (1941).
15. Britz v. Kinsvater, 87 Ariz. 385, 351 P.2d 986 (1960), noted in 2 ARIz L. Rzv.
275 (1960) ; Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163 P.2d 869 (1945);
Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 254 Pac. 946 (1927) ; Janisse v. Winston Invest-
ment Co., 154 Cal. App. 2d 580, 317 P.2d 48 (1957) ; State ex rel. Fatzer v. Miller,
177 Kan. 324, 279 P.2d 223 (1955); Richardson v. Cortner, 100 So. 2d 854 (Miss.
1958), noted in 30 Miss. L.J. 208 (1959) ; Fidelity Security Corp. v. Brugman, 137
Or. 38, 1 P.2d 131 (1931) ; Blake v. Yount, 42 Wash. 101, 84 Pac. 625 (1906).
16. In re Bibbey, 9 F.2d 944, 945 (D. Minn. 1925).
17. Silverstein v. Wakefield, 112 So. 2d 406 (Fla. App. 1959) ; Lesser v. Strubbe,
56 N.J. Super. 274, 152 A.2d 409 (1959); McCall v. Smith, 184 Wash. 615, 52 P.2d
338 (1935) ; Clemson v. Best, 174 Wash. 601, 25 P.2d 1032 (1933).
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Even though the broker may be considered as the agent of the lender,
if it is clear that, in procuring the loan, he was acting as agent for the
borrower, a commission paid to him for these services may not be added
to the contractual interest rate for purposes of determining usury.' 8 Some
cases add the additional requirement that the lender must, nevertheless,
have no knowledge of or interest in the commission. 9
Even if there is no basis for finding an agency relationship between
the broker and borrower, most courts will not find usury when the lender's
agent charges a commission for procuring the loan in excess of the
maximum legal rate of interest without the lender's knowledge, either
actual or implied. 20 It is only a minority of jurisdictions that penalize one
who places funds in the hands of a special agent to be loaned out when the
latter exacts a commission, despite any lack of knowledge by the principal. 2'
In Busk, the court claims that Washington follows the majority view
and requires knowledge by the lender, either express or implied, that the
broker is charging a commission before that amount will be attributed to
him. 22 The Washington statute, in addition to providing that the acts and
dealings of an agent in loaning money will be binding on the principal,
states that ". . . where the same person acts as an agent of the borrower
and lender, he shall be deemed the agent of the lender for the purposes of
this act."'23 (Emphasis added.) Consequently, if the facts indicate a dual
agency, there apparently arises a presumption that he was acting for the
lender. It is submitted that the decision of the Washington court based
on this presumption was erroneous. This presumption is not a conclusion
of law; it may be rebutted by evidence. In the instant case, in addition
to testimony by both lender and broker that no agency was intended, the
majority admits that the defendants applied for the mortgage loan before
the plaintiff ever became associated with the broker. It further concedes
that the defendants, as a result of similar past transactions with the same
broker anticipated and actually did promise to pay a certain percentage of
the loan as a commission for procuring the funds.2 4 Even more important
18. Niles v. Kavanaugh, 179 Cal. 98, 175 Pac. 462 (1918) ; Rosenhouse v. Kimbrig,
147 So. 2d 354 (Fla. App. 1962) ; Jorgenson v. Stirling, 35 Idaho 785, 209 Pac. 271
(1922) ; Terminal Bank v. Dubroff, 66 Misc. 100, 120 N.Y. Supp. 609 (Sup. Ct. 1910) ;
Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 135 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
19. Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 141 U.S. 384 (1891); Richards v. Purdy, 90
Iowa 502, 58 N.W. 886 (1894).
20. Nuckolls v. Bank of California, Nat'l Ass'n, 10 Cal. 2d 278, 74 P.2d 271
(1937) ; Argintar v. Lydell, 132 Fla. 45, 180 So. 346 (1938) ; Bovee v. Butters, 92
Minn. 149, 99 N.W. 641 (1904); Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Kieke, 244 S.W.2d 569
(Tex. Civ. App.. 1951) ; Groves v. Nat'l Loan & Investment Co., 102 S.W.2d 508
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
21. Mendez v. Murdock, 83 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Mo. 1949) ; Western Storage &
Warehouse Co. v. Glasner, 169 Mo. 38, 68 S.W. 917 (1902) ; Hecker v. Putney, 196
S.W.2d 442 (Mo. App. 1946) ; Bean v. Rumrill, 69 Okla. 300, 172 Pac. 452 (1918).
See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 691, 737-45 (1957).
22. 396 P.2d 171, 175 (Wash. 1964).
23. Rzv. Con9 o WASH. ANN. tit. 19, ch. 19.52.030 (1961).
24. Busk v. Hoard, 396 P.2d 171, 173 (Wash. 1964).
43
Donnelly: Annulment - Personal Jurisdiction - Court of Plaintiff's Domicile
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
is the finding of the trial court that, as far as this phase of the entire
transaction was concerned, the broker was not acting for the lender at all.
". [I]t was the province of the jury to weigh the facts and decide
whether the promissory note was tainted with usury.' 25 ". . . [I]f we were
of the opinion that the trial court should have resolved the factual dispute
the other way, the constitution does not authorize this court to substitute
its finding for that of the trial court.
'2 6
Although the dissent in Busk stretches the facts when it declares that
the broker was a "seller" of the investment to the lender-"buyer," there
seems to be no justification for a finding of agency between those parties
at the time defendants contracted to pay the broker's commission.27
Assuming that there was a substantial basis for so finding, Washington
still requires that the principal have knowledge, either bxpress or implied,
of the broker's activities before he can be charged with usury. Since it
is admitted that plaintiff had no actual knowledge of the procurement fee,
he must have been charged with implied knowledge. But the fact that at
this juncture the broker was acting solely for his own benefit might mitigate
against charging the lender with knowledge since: "The fact that an agent
has interests so adverse to those of the principal that he would be unlikely
to reveal relevant knowledge may prevent its imputation to the principal. '28
The borrowers were in a far better position to protect themselves when
they applied for the loan. They were aware at that time that they would be
required to pay both the broker's commission and the interest on the loan,
which were two separate and distinct propositions.
The Busk decision imposes unfortunate consequences upon the lender
who, after all, was not the first one to deal with the middleman. Proceeding
further upon the premise that there was a true agency relationship between
lender and broker, plaintiff could no doubt recover for breach of duty
since ". . . an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the
benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency." 29 How-
ever the broker does not appear to have been a party to the principal case
and would not be bound by its findings if they were asserted against him. 30
Consequently in another action by the "principal," the question of agency
supposedly being one of fact for the jury in Washington, 31 it is conceivable
25. Colagrossi v. Hendrickson, 50 Wash. 2d 266, 271, 310 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1957).
26. Thorn.like v. Hesperian Orchards, 54 Wash. 2d 570, 575, 343 P.2d 183, 186.
(1959).
27. Due to plaintiff's total reliance upon the broker's business experience in pre-
paring the papers and handling the collections, there can be no doubt that an agency
relationship between them arose after plaintiff had determined to invest his money.
28. SEAVEY, AGENCY § 102 (1964).
29. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), AGENCY § 387 (1958).
30. "Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the
parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action. RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 68 (1942).
31. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, 54 Wash. 2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959)
Colagrossi v. Hendrickson, 50 Wash. 2d 266, 310 P.2d 1072 (1957).
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and even likely that there would be a finding of no agency, no duty of
loyalty and no liability to the lender who stands to lose over half of his
investment. Thus it is submitted that while the public interest requires a
strong stand against the evils of usury, the existing law should be applied
so that only those who can be properly charged with responsibility for a
usurious transaction will be penalized.
Edward Gerald Donnelly, Jr.
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